That all these women shall be wives in common for all these men | Plato's Republic, Book V

Thus begins a digression which will continue until Book 8

Today, we continue our read-along of Plato’s Republic, the latest installment in our philosophical read-alongs. (And don’t worry: I’m already thinking about the 2026 books.)

Here’s the schedule:

• March 31: Book I

• April 7: Book II

• April 14: Book III

• April 21: Reading Week

• April 28: Book IV

• May 5: Book V

• May 8: Members-Only Zoom Call, 3PM Eastern

• May 12: Book VI

• May 18: Members-Only Zoom Call, 8PM Eastern

• May 19: Book VII

• May 26: Reading Week

• June 2: Book VIII

• June 9: Book IX

• June 16: Book X

• June 22: Members-Only Zoom Call, 8PM Eastern

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In the last two books of The Republic, Socrates has been providing an account of a just city. This is, recall, in an attempt to give a characterization of what justice is, which will equally apply to a person. ‘We are trying to define the whole conduct of life,’ Socrates says in Book 1. Perhaps we have gotten close to it when Socrates provides his account of virtue in Book 4.

The principle we laid down right at the start, when we first founded our city, as something we must stick to throughout — this, I think, or some form of it, is justice. What we laid down – and often repeated, if you remember – was that each individual should follow, out of the occuptations avilable in the city, the one for which his natural character best fitted him…justice is this business of everyone performing his own task. (433a-b)

As we divide the city into groups based on function and evaluate it based on each group being able to perform that function, thus ensuring the harmony of the whole, so too is the soul said to be healthy and vigorous when its parts perform their appointed tasks.

This opens up a new line of inquiry: what do we say of a soul, or a city, which is not justice? We have one perfectly good word for it: unjust. Yet, deficiencies often come in a variety of forms. Socrates says the bad ones fall into four categories.

And then he does not tell us what those are, because Polemarchus interrupts the discussion. Thus begins a digression which will continue until Book 8, when we will finally discuss the four bad categories. But it is a worthwhile digression, because Books 5-7 are where we encounter the philosopher-kings and the Allegory of the Cave.

The issue that initiates the digression is Socrates’ claim that wives and children will be held in common. ‘They will see the necessity of making everything as nearly as possible “shared among friends,”’ Socrates says in Book (423e-424). The remark is casually passed over until Polemarchus objects (though it is Adeimantus who brings the objection to the group).

Socrates will now need to defend what he says. He notes that this is nearly like a trial; Glaucon, Plato’s brother, assures him that he will be acquitted of misleading them, so he should proceed; Socrates, of course, has terrible luck with juries. So, Socrates proceeds to discuss the relationship between the sexes, especially for the guardians.

Zhen Linru Meets His Wives

Just as female watchdogs should do their share of watching a herd, so too should there be female guardians. For the work the guardians must do, any difference between the sexes is irrelevant, it seems, and so we know the female guardians will also need the same upbringing and training. This is already unconventional — maybe it isn’t so surprising that family relations will also be unconventional in the city. ‘Only a fool regards as laughable anything other than what is bad’ (452d).

Eventually, we come to the more radical suggestion:

That all these women [the female guardians] shall be wives in common for all these men [the male guardians]. That none of them shall live as individuals with any of the men. That children in turn shall belong to all of them. That no parent shall know its own child, no child its own parent. (457d)

It’s important to remember that the dimension of evaluation here is not feasibility but rather optimality. We are looking for the ideal arrangement for the guardians. What makes it an ideal? If it facilitates the guardians’ playing their proper function within the city. That, and that alone, is the criterion. So, when Socrates appeals to this fostering unity among the guardians and promoting their happiness, this is what he has in mind. It makes them better guardians.

But what will bring this city into reality? The philosopher-kings.

There is no end to suffering, Glaucon, for our cities, and non, I suspect, for the human race, unless either philosophers become kings in our cities, or the people who are now called kings and rulers become real, true philosophers—unless there is this amalgamation of political power and philosophy, with all those people whose inclination is to pursue one or other exclusively being forcibly prevented from doing so. Otherwise there is not the remotest chance of the political arrangements we have described coming about – to the extent that they can – or seeing the light of day. (473c-e)

Glaucon immediately notes that this proposal is the sort of thing that could get a philosopher killed. (No kidding!) But Socrates believes this is justified, because philosophers are the ones who appreciate the forms or character of things (476a).

‘The same applies to just and unjust, good and bad, and all the forms and characters of things. Each is in itself one, but because they appear all over the place, through their association with various activities and bodies and with one another, each gives the appearance of being many…That, then, is how I distinguish those you were talking about just now – those who enjoy being spectators, those who take pleasure in any art of skill, people who are active – from the subjects of our present discussion, the people whom alone we could truly call philosophers.’ (476a-b)

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Here are a few of my favorite comments from last week.

Daniel writes:

Just a quick point from me in this chapter. At one point Socrates quickly mentioned something about how if you are "your own master" you are by definition also your own slave, and how that's perhaps not the right way to look at discipline (if anyone remembers the quote better do let me know).

I thought this was another great example of how influential the Republic really is, given that the master slave dialectic is a big part of Hegel's work much much later. Also it's still played out these days with the idea of toxic productivity and being your own boss. And it was only a little aside from Socrates! Really cool to see.

Daniel – like some other commentators – is seeing just how foundational Plato’s Republic is. It’s why it’s a book we should be reading our entire lives. Another commentator, T.W., sees some intersections with Confucianism; while historically they would be distinct, finding commonalities between distinct traditions is always a valuable thing to do.

Michelle writes:

thought Plato’s definition of courage was interesting- that courage is preservation of what we should fear. I took this to mean that courage is about preserving our highest values at any cost- knowing that the ancient Greeks also thought slaves were cowards because they did not act to preserve their freedom, even if it meant suicide at their capture.

If we value our “just” city most of all, then we should fear unruly guardians, and must maintain the proposed education system at all costs, even in the face of other temptations, fears, luxuries, etc.

It is a very conservative, change-fearing approach. In my professional life I work with companies and people during big change events, and it makes me wonder about Plato’s own constitution and personal experience with change. Fear is not an uncommon response. Is Plato (or Socrates) just being an old man shaking fist at clouds?

But I do like that courage in this worldview requires a cause- very different, I think, from our modern definition which takes bravery and courage to be synonyms and courage is reduced to “feel the fear and do it anyways”.

This is exactly right. I don’t know if we moderns really have a definition of courage, but whatever we think of it…it isn’t what the Greeks meant. While it is wrongheaded to say that we thus should adopt the Greek view, we should certainly at least consider it and let it challenge our own assumptions.

Wayne writes:

"Moreover, we've heard many people say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own."

The problem I have with the definition of justice is that it depends on Socrates' rigorous definition of, and construction of this idealized city. It doesn't account for cases where two or more people cannot do their work because of an exclusive use of of some resource, or a collision between the common good of the city and an individual's affairs.

In the text, it does…and that might be part of the justification for the philosopher-king. I am optimistic about the ways human beings spontaneously organize, though; I’m also a believer that sometimes individual deviation from one’s appointed work might be what allows a city to stay healthy and vital.