There is so much in this chapter. I omitted discussing Aristotle on money-lending and usury, for example. I expect most commenters will want to take issue with Aristotle's view of slaves and women, and rightly so. Looking forward to the discussion.
I understand the space constraints, so this is no heavy criticism, more a lament: I do wish you had included discussion of those who are "slaves by convention" or force, and are thus slaves unjustly. Here I think we can plausibly interpret Aristotle as being relatively radical for his time. I know many through the centuries have interpreted Aristotle as a Greek chauvinist, effectively saying that those who are "barbarians" (non-Greek speakers) might all plausibly fit into this shocking "natural slave" category. But I.6 cuts against this, I think, and suggests that there are in fact a great number of people who have been captured in battle and sold to foreign masters (a relatively common way to obtain a slave in the world he inhabited) who are definitionally, unquestionably, unjustly captive. This, at least on a more expansive reading, would imply that many if not most Athenian slaves were slaves unjustly. Certainly no modern abolitionist tract, but worth consideration.
Add to this the possible contextual background: assume these are, as they are often described, "lecture notes" of a kind from the Lyceum. Assume, too, that Aristotle's audience would have been an assortment of mostly wealthy young men from households with slaves. Assume, finally, that Aristotle has an interest in presenting an argument against slavery as practiced, but with enough plausible deniability to maintain students in attendance. A measured criticism with possible radical implications seems, to me, to fit with this admittedly tentative tale.
This, I take it, is the direction Mary P. Nichols goes in her Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics. There are effectively three ways Aristotle on natural slavery is commonly read: 1. "Natural slave" is a large set, including basically all non-Greeks or at least a large number of foreigners; 2. "Natural slave" is a small set, including only those so intellectually dependent that they are literally improved by "rulership" (so whatever people are intellectually capable of following basic commands but not independently reasoning); 3. "Natural slave" is a hypothetical set with a definition that no human beings actually fit (hence: as different from other men as men are from beasts, thus not a human being). 2 seems plausible to me, and if I'm in an esoteric mood, 3 seems possible, and I think Nichols leans toward 3. Her case for this is strengthened by Aristotle later reflecting on the "virtues" appropriate to slaves. But wait a second, she says, virtue requires reflection and choice! But a "natural slave" seems to lack this capacity, so a slave-in-fact exercising virtue seems to explicitly imply they don't meet the "natural slave" definition we've been working to build.
That’s a fascinating insight. I know my Aristotle professor in grad school (a Straussian) was partial to something like 3, but I only studied NE with him and was never able to get his full view on the Politics.
Great insight. After reading the first comment here, I started thinking about Epictetus and how he became the voice we know today. And I recall reading (though I haven’t done extensive research) how someone of his class could become such a powerful voice for that we discuss him these thousands of years later- that he was not only naturally intelligent academically but also wise enough to understand how to navigate hierarchy humbly (a lame gait assisting in his humble physical appearance).
I read Aristotle solely to identify those elements of his thinking that may still be relevant to us today. Classics are texts that have stood the test of time; they have something important to teach regardless of time and place. Therefore, my goal for this read-along is to see how THE POLITICS can help me better understand the world in which I live and my proper role in it.
Here are several ideas in Book I that I find rewarding:
First. I have always found Plato’s disdain for human affairs too inhibitive for the building of bridges between philosophy and everyday life. Therefore, it is encouraging to read right from the start that Aristotle’s purpose for THE POLITICS is to complete his “philosophy concerning human affairs.”
Second. I also find Aristotle’s methodology to be more effective, flexible, and open-ended. Unlike Plato’s reliance on finding exact definitions to capture the essence of things, Aristotle employs an empirical (we might say scientific) approach to observe human affairs and collect samples. In I.xiii (I’m using the Penguin Classics edition) he writes: “If we look at the matter case by case it will become clearer. For those who talk in generalities and say that virtue is ‘a good condition of the soul’, or that it is ‘right conduct’ or the like, delude themselves. Better than those who look for definitions in that manner are those who, like Gorgias, enumerate the different virtues.”
Third. I believe Aristotle’s fundamental insight that “man is by nature a political animal” opens the door to a line of thinking that leads directly to important contemporary philosophers such as Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas. The implication is that a human individual can only achieve her full potential in the company of other humans; or, as Arendt would say, in plurality.
Despite these productive beginnings, I am troubled by certain elements of and open questions in Aristotle’s thinking.
First. THE POLITICS begins with: “Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state”. But nowhere in this chapter does Aristotle explain in concrete terms what this “most sovereign of all goods” is except some vague reference to “self-sufficiency,” which is ambiguous and questionable. (Please correct me if I have missed some important clues.) I hope there is a more satisfactory answer in the later chapters.
Second. I am not clear about what Aristotle means by “political animal.” Is there a difference between “social animal” and “political animal”? Living and working in the company of other humans make us social creatures, but what makes us political? Is there a distinctly political dimension? As we see in Arendt’s THE HUMAN CONDITION, the importance of this question is more than academic; instead, it carries far-reaching implications for how we live our lives.
Third. Aristotle appeals to “nature” and “the purpose of nature” constantly. In doing so, I believe he is mistaking the products of human relations for nature. As nature, social institutions are “as they should be” and cannot be altered; as products of social, historical circumstances, however, they acquire a contingent nature and can obviously be reformed. For me, this is the fundamental insight and contribution of historical materialism. The Hegelian Marxist Georg Lukacs addresses this mistake directly with his theory of reification in his classic HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS. For example, once we take this approach, we can begin to analyze slavery and other types of domination as social institutions created by a particular combination of cultural, social, economic, and political circumstances rather than as a product of “nature.”
For anyone looking for the context of slavery at this time and how it manifested, this submission by George Tridimas is a great start. There is rather grim economic modelling which, from what I gather, was also used to examine the economics of slavery in the Southern States, which goes some way to explaining the different models of slavery across Greece.
Tridimas, G. (2023) ‘Choice of slavery institutions in Ancient Greece: Athenian chattels and Spartan helots’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 19(6), pp. 820–836. doi:10.1017/S174413742300019X.
I was struck, after completing a reading of Nicomachean Ethics over summer at the change in style from that to book I of Politics.
Having used logic to work out what it means to live a virtuous life we are then confronted with what it means to use our framework for flourishing in a polis that necessitates hierarchies and the idea of ‘lesser’.
I scanned back through book X of the Ethics and despite passing references to the poet Thgeognis, and the myth of the sleepy shepherd, Endymion, a chapter that is on pleasure seems rather devoid of poetry and myth.
And yet here, in a treatise on statehood, chapter 2, in quick succession, he quotes Euripides’s “This is why the poets say “it’s is fitting for Greeks to rule barbarians”-the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature the same thing” and Hesiod ““first a house, and a woman, and ox for ploughing”-for poor persons have an ox instead of a servant.”
If Homer’s Daedalus could truly animate statues, there would be no need for slaves, but “Life is action, not production, the slave is therefore a subordinate in matter concerning action.”
In the Republic, Plato addresses the dangers of poetry and myth in that the populace should be able grasp belief through reason alone. Yet here is Aristotle leaning heavily on them both to propagate what amounts to an Ignoble Lie.
He acknowledges that there is a debate around the ‘virtue’ of slavery. Though in the notes, there doesn’t seem to be proof of much discourse around the morality of slavery. We could speculate that the debate was within the Lyceum itself, but he is clear on where his thoughts lie.
He uses emotionally charged words, like “licentiousness and cowardice”, twice in that combination, to describe barbarians/slaves and to justify man’s mastery over woman.
From Aristotle to Kipling in ‘The White Man’s Burden’, people have used myth, poetry, art to justify racial superiority as moral duty. I read ‘If’ and the works of Roald Dahl in the context of men with terrible opinions that have nonetheless, written amazing things. I don’t know what lies ahead in Politics, as it is a first read, but will remain conscious of Pierre Hadot’s urging to understand ancient philosophy in its original context. Aristotle didn’t invent slavery or a woman’s place in society, but he did feel the need to justify it.
The change in style is quite jarring. I do wonder how much of Aristotle's use of poetry and myth is a response to Plato. (I admit I'm also partial to appealing to poetry, though not uncritically.) Of course even Plato is inconsistent! Socrates invokes Homer several times in the Republic without seeming to mind that he was appealing to a poet.
I am in the first few steps of a thousand-mile journey through philosophy. My academic background and passion lay in history; the closest I had come to philosophy before was through E. H. Carr and Marx. Taking stock of my reading since January, I’m struck by how much poetry, and music, philosophers use to express complex ideas. Bertrand Russell quotes Lucretius, and Nietzsche writes poetry alongside syllogisms and logic.
I know there are rough seas ahead. I read the Heidegger essay on technology in anticipation of next years reading framework and as dry and hard to follow as I found it, even there, Heidegger quotes the poetry of Friedrich Holderlin.
I have settled on three content providers for this journey, to try and limit the rabbit hole of the internet, but these walk throughs are an amazing standout, thank you.
I wish I had read Nicomachaen Ethics already! So many ideas to unpack in your comment. One in particular, “Life is action, not production, the slave is therefore a subordinate in matter concerning action.”…. Makes me wonder what Aristotle may have said about either Phaedo or the Elean School? I first thought of Epictetus but forgot that he lived long long after Aristotle
Whilst I don't disagree with most of what has been said on the topic of slavery and Aristotle, I think we are at risk of overkneading the dough on this one.
The sentiment of righteous intelligence and moral superiority is one of the most damaging instruments in the toolbox of ignorance and educational failure that is the curse of our times. From that perspective, beyond passing self-congratulatory judgement why waste further time on a beknighted scribbler from a dark period of history, sunk in the ignorance, superstition and moral depravity?
As Vico pointed out three hundred years ago, we have little chance of understanding Aristotle or any other non-modern writer unless we make the effort to see the world as they saw it - impossible to achieve fully but can be done to some extent because of our shared human nature and our knowledge of history, sociology and anthropology.
I do agree that there's a danger here. Often, I err in the other direction: understand the arguments as best I can and bracketing moral judgment. (It's what I tried to do with our reading of The Republic earlier this year.)
Lot's of interesting ideas here. The one that is capturing my thinking is the "slave by nature". Slavery is so bad in our view that the word derails thinking. If we replace the word "slave" by low-wage worker, can we say that some people are in this class by nature, as opposed to by circumstance?
Similarly, can we say that there are people who are natural managers (instead of rulers) and employees (instead of ruled people)?
And in today's world is someone born to higher status parents equivalent to "the greeks" and someone born to lower status parents "the barbarians"?
I think this a really interesting take, David. It actually helped me re-orient how I think about Book I. I also found it difficult to get past Aristotle's discussion of slavery on the first read because it was absolutely derailing.
Your manager / employee analogy is compelling because it almost abstracts away the "human" element and starts to build what feels like a community-focused teleology. It emphasizes disposition, position and skill -- what allows each person to best fulfill their role within the community (or given organization!). I highlight the community aspect because Aristotle's concern here doesn't seem to be the individual's purpose but rather the function of the community/state/household as a whole. In that context, the specifics of who is being discussed (slave, woman, child) are less relevant than how there is natural hierarchy built into various communities and fulfilling role well, with adequate relevant virtue. Of course, we have to remember the historical setting -- in Aristotle's time, "just" slavery and the natural rule of men over women are largely taken for granted. It's a good reminder to read in context and avoid eisegesis.
The discussion of virtue in Chapter 13 stood out to me as well -- it almost feels utilitarian. Virtue seems to matter only as long as it contributes to the fulfillment of one's role or function within the social order.
This sentence in particular stood out to me. I would love other' thoughts on it:
"Questions arise either way, for if there is such a virtue, how will they differ from free persons? But if there is not, though they are human beings and share in reason, it is odd."
I have made sense of Book 1 by taking the human out so I can feel less bad about checking my own moral compass to fully engage with the argument here -- so it's striking to me to revisit the passage Jared highlighted about those who are incapable of sharing or can be fully self sufficient which he neatly summarizes: "Either a beast or a god — but either way, inhuman."
This is an interesting point. I'm not an historian or a linguist, so I have no idea, but it IS interesting to wonder whether "slave" is the best possible translation. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. Either way, I'm skeptical that some people are suited to "high" or "low" work, though some of us may more suited to teaching or flying airplanes or making pottery. On the other hand, if we give "the system" some sort of opinion on the matter, some people do end up being taken for granted as better for one altitude of work versus another. Thank you for your comment; it was a perspective I hadn't considered, and it's interesting to think about.
What if our conception of high and low work was different? If playing the guitar or painting were the most well compensated work, would we still think that people's ability was a choice, or would we think it was more of their "nature"?
I'm not sure if I've misunderstood you or you've misunderstood me - no matter. I agree that people vary widely in their abilities and some people will be restricted to manual jobs that require limited skills and limited decision making. When I referred to "choice", I meant the political decision to allow these jobs to be badly paid.
Ah - I think we are looking at different sides of the bargain. I am taking societal values as given, and asking whether "nature" determines where the earner fits. You seem to be taking the perspective that societal values are a choice, nothing intrinsically needs to be paid more or less than anything else.
I guess that I take issue with Aristotle's treatment of goods made within the household versus goods acquired through commerce, that is through purchase in the marketplace of the same goods. Goods made within the household are not free, despite what he says, because with limited resources, home manufacturing of one good, say olives, implies less of other goods, say feta cheese. And besides, the tradeoff goes increasingly against olives as the household harvests more of them: increasingly, feta production in pounds drops more, as one more bushel of olives is pulled off the trees. This is diminishing returns to olive production within the household. Suppose instead that more olives are purchased in the marketplace. The price ratio facing a household between olives and feta is constant in the marketplace. At some point, the household gives up less feta by buying a bushel of olives in the marketplace than by trying to grow the olives itself. This may be what Aristotle is referring to when he says that commerce is unlimited while home manufacture is limited. But by the same token, commerce is a valuable alternative to doing it yourself. If someone in Sicily can grow olives more cheaply than households in Attica can, then that commerce is worthwhile and it makes Attica wealthier. (I also detest his views on usury: taking out a well-considered loan increases wealth over trying to use one's own savings. Without 'evil' usury, large projects would be impossible.)
An interesting point I saw in the text is the moral distinction between two types of wealth acquisition. There is the form of acquisition that is necessary for living well. This form is limited by nature because the necessities of life are finite. The second came with the introduction of money and markets. Here, the goal shifts from acquiring good to accumulating currency for its own sake. Since money is theoretically infinite, the desire for it also becomes infinite, and thus unnatural. This would likely make Aristotle the first documented philosopher to identify and criticize unlimited wealth accumulation. He saw that the moment when money becomes the end rather than the means, it corrupts the economic function and displaces the true goal of virtuous activity.
By far the weakest argument for me at this point is the Man as better than Woman one. He seems to suggest at one point that there has to be a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference to justify a hard distinction in role, but then his argument seems to end with women lacking "authority". If anyone has a more interesting or charitable interpretation of his argument here I'd love to hear it, as I think I might be missing something.
Apart from this, lots of very interesting stuff already. Even relatively felt charitable to the master/slave distinctions mentioned here, with it being quite a good parallel to boss/worker
It's a surprisingly sparse argument! Which is surprising because, even if you ultimately reject it, there seems to be a stronger case to be made for natural difference between the sexes than natural differences between Greeks and barbarians.
It also takes for granted conventional views on women which Aristotle's teacher explicitly denies in the Republic. Socrates says that the only difference between male and female guardians might be in how much physical exertion they are made to perform. (I often roughly characterize this as 'They're the same, but the men lift the heavier stuff.')
You’ve probably answered this before (?) but are there publisher/translation preferences on: Nicomachean Ethics as well as Plato’s Statesman, and Laws? (I participated in the read along of The Republic and have that one)
For Nicomachean Ethics, I recommend the translation from University of Chicago Press by Bartlett and Collins. For Plato, I always recommend the Complete Works from Hackett.
There is so much in this chapter. I omitted discussing Aristotle on money-lending and usury, for example. I expect most commenters will want to take issue with Aristotle's view of slaves and women, and rightly so. Looking forward to the discussion.
I understand the space constraints, so this is no heavy criticism, more a lament: I do wish you had included discussion of those who are "slaves by convention" or force, and are thus slaves unjustly. Here I think we can plausibly interpret Aristotle as being relatively radical for his time. I know many through the centuries have interpreted Aristotle as a Greek chauvinist, effectively saying that those who are "barbarians" (non-Greek speakers) might all plausibly fit into this shocking "natural slave" category. But I.6 cuts against this, I think, and suggests that there are in fact a great number of people who have been captured in battle and sold to foreign masters (a relatively common way to obtain a slave in the world he inhabited) who are definitionally, unquestionably, unjustly captive. This, at least on a more expansive reading, would imply that many if not most Athenian slaves were slaves unjustly. Certainly no modern abolitionist tract, but worth consideration.
Add to this the possible contextual background: assume these are, as they are often described, "lecture notes" of a kind from the Lyceum. Assume, too, that Aristotle's audience would have been an assortment of mostly wealthy young men from households with slaves. Assume, finally, that Aristotle has an interest in presenting an argument against slavery as practiced, but with enough plausible deniability to maintain students in attendance. A measured criticism with possible radical implications seems, to me, to fit with this admittedly tentative tale.
This, I take it, is the direction Mary P. Nichols goes in her Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics. There are effectively three ways Aristotle on natural slavery is commonly read: 1. "Natural slave" is a large set, including basically all non-Greeks or at least a large number of foreigners; 2. "Natural slave" is a small set, including only those so intellectually dependent that they are literally improved by "rulership" (so whatever people are intellectually capable of following basic commands but not independently reasoning); 3. "Natural slave" is a hypothetical set with a definition that no human beings actually fit (hence: as different from other men as men are from beasts, thus not a human being). 2 seems plausible to me, and if I'm in an esoteric mood, 3 seems possible, and I think Nichols leans toward 3. Her case for this is strengthened by Aristotle later reflecting on the "virtues" appropriate to slaves. But wait a second, she says, virtue requires reflection and choice! But a "natural slave" seems to lack this capacity, so a slave-in-fact exercising virtue seems to explicitly imply they don't meet the "natural slave" definition we've been working to build.
That’s a fascinating insight. I know my Aristotle professor in grad school (a Straussian) was partial to something like 3, but I only studied NE with him and was never able to get his full view on the Politics.
Great insight. After reading the first comment here, I started thinking about Epictetus and how he became the voice we know today. And I recall reading (though I haven’t done extensive research) how someone of his class could become such a powerful voice for that we discuss him these thousands of years later- that he was not only naturally intelligent academically but also wise enough to understand how to navigate hierarchy humbly (a lame gait assisting in his humble physical appearance).
I read Aristotle solely to identify those elements of his thinking that may still be relevant to us today. Classics are texts that have stood the test of time; they have something important to teach regardless of time and place. Therefore, my goal for this read-along is to see how THE POLITICS can help me better understand the world in which I live and my proper role in it.
Here are several ideas in Book I that I find rewarding:
First. I have always found Plato’s disdain for human affairs too inhibitive for the building of bridges between philosophy and everyday life. Therefore, it is encouraging to read right from the start that Aristotle’s purpose for THE POLITICS is to complete his “philosophy concerning human affairs.”
Second. I also find Aristotle’s methodology to be more effective, flexible, and open-ended. Unlike Plato’s reliance on finding exact definitions to capture the essence of things, Aristotle employs an empirical (we might say scientific) approach to observe human affairs and collect samples. In I.xiii (I’m using the Penguin Classics edition) he writes: “If we look at the matter case by case it will become clearer. For those who talk in generalities and say that virtue is ‘a good condition of the soul’, or that it is ‘right conduct’ or the like, delude themselves. Better than those who look for definitions in that manner are those who, like Gorgias, enumerate the different virtues.”
Third. I believe Aristotle’s fundamental insight that “man is by nature a political animal” opens the door to a line of thinking that leads directly to important contemporary philosophers such as Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas. The implication is that a human individual can only achieve her full potential in the company of other humans; or, as Arendt would say, in plurality.
Despite these productive beginnings, I am troubled by certain elements of and open questions in Aristotle’s thinking.
First. THE POLITICS begins with: “Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state”. But nowhere in this chapter does Aristotle explain in concrete terms what this “most sovereign of all goods” is except some vague reference to “self-sufficiency,” which is ambiguous and questionable. (Please correct me if I have missed some important clues.) I hope there is a more satisfactory answer in the later chapters.
Second. I am not clear about what Aristotle means by “political animal.” Is there a difference between “social animal” and “political animal”? Living and working in the company of other humans make us social creatures, but what makes us political? Is there a distinctly political dimension? As we see in Arendt’s THE HUMAN CONDITION, the importance of this question is more than academic; instead, it carries far-reaching implications for how we live our lives.
Third. Aristotle appeals to “nature” and “the purpose of nature” constantly. In doing so, I believe he is mistaking the products of human relations for nature. As nature, social institutions are “as they should be” and cannot be altered; as products of social, historical circumstances, however, they acquire a contingent nature and can obviously be reformed. For me, this is the fundamental insight and contribution of historical materialism. The Hegelian Marxist Georg Lukacs addresses this mistake directly with his theory of reification in his classic HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS. For example, once we take this approach, we can begin to analyze slavery and other types of domination as social institutions created by a particular combination of cultural, social, economic, and political circumstances rather than as a product of “nature.”
For anyone looking for the context of slavery at this time and how it manifested, this submission by George Tridimas is a great start. There is rather grim economic modelling which, from what I gather, was also used to examine the economics of slavery in the Southern States, which goes some way to explaining the different models of slavery across Greece.
Tridimas, G. (2023) ‘Choice of slavery institutions in Ancient Greece: Athenian chattels and Spartan helots’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 19(6), pp. 820–836. doi:10.1017/S174413742300019X.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics/article/choice-of-slavery-institutions-in-ancient-greece-athenian-chattels-and-spartan-helots/DA904BD5451B7DD8741DBDDFA5BC7DFF
I was struck, after completing a reading of Nicomachean Ethics over summer at the change in style from that to book I of Politics.
Having used logic to work out what it means to live a virtuous life we are then confronted with what it means to use our framework for flourishing in a polis that necessitates hierarchies and the idea of ‘lesser’.
I scanned back through book X of the Ethics and despite passing references to the poet Thgeognis, and the myth of the sleepy shepherd, Endymion, a chapter that is on pleasure seems rather devoid of poetry and myth.
And yet here, in a treatise on statehood, chapter 2, in quick succession, he quotes Euripides’s “This is why the poets say “it’s is fitting for Greeks to rule barbarians”-the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature the same thing” and Hesiod ““first a house, and a woman, and ox for ploughing”-for poor persons have an ox instead of a servant.”
If Homer’s Daedalus could truly animate statues, there would be no need for slaves, but “Life is action, not production, the slave is therefore a subordinate in matter concerning action.”
In the Republic, Plato addresses the dangers of poetry and myth in that the populace should be able grasp belief through reason alone. Yet here is Aristotle leaning heavily on them both to propagate what amounts to an Ignoble Lie.
He acknowledges that there is a debate around the ‘virtue’ of slavery. Though in the notes, there doesn’t seem to be proof of much discourse around the morality of slavery. We could speculate that the debate was within the Lyceum itself, but he is clear on where his thoughts lie.
He uses emotionally charged words, like “licentiousness and cowardice”, twice in that combination, to describe barbarians/slaves and to justify man’s mastery over woman.
From Aristotle to Kipling in ‘The White Man’s Burden’, people have used myth, poetry, art to justify racial superiority as moral duty. I read ‘If’ and the works of Roald Dahl in the context of men with terrible opinions that have nonetheless, written amazing things. I don’t know what lies ahead in Politics, as it is a first read, but will remain conscious of Pierre Hadot’s urging to understand ancient philosophy in its original context. Aristotle didn’t invent slavery or a woman’s place in society, but he did feel the need to justify it.
The change in style is quite jarring. I do wonder how much of Aristotle's use of poetry and myth is a response to Plato. (I admit I'm also partial to appealing to poetry, though not uncritically.) Of course even Plato is inconsistent! Socrates invokes Homer several times in the Republic without seeming to mind that he was appealing to a poet.
I am in the first few steps of a thousand-mile journey through philosophy. My academic background and passion lay in history; the closest I had come to philosophy before was through E. H. Carr and Marx. Taking stock of my reading since January, I’m struck by how much poetry, and music, philosophers use to express complex ideas. Bertrand Russell quotes Lucretius, and Nietzsche writes poetry alongside syllogisms and logic.
I know there are rough seas ahead. I read the Heidegger essay on technology in anticipation of next years reading framework and as dry and hard to follow as I found it, even there, Heidegger quotes the poetry of Friedrich Holderlin.
I have settled on three content providers for this journey, to try and limit the rabbit hole of the internet, but these walk throughs are an amazing standout, thank you.
I wish I had read Nicomachaen Ethics already! So many ideas to unpack in your comment. One in particular, “Life is action, not production, the slave is therefore a subordinate in matter concerning action.”…. Makes me wonder what Aristotle may have said about either Phaedo or the Elean School? I first thought of Epictetus but forgot that he lived long long after Aristotle
Thanks for this comment. I enjoyed reading your reflections. I haven't read Plato in a LONG time, so your bringing that up was a nice refresher.
Whilst I don't disagree with most of what has been said on the topic of slavery and Aristotle, I think we are at risk of overkneading the dough on this one.
The sentiment of righteous intelligence and moral superiority is one of the most damaging instruments in the toolbox of ignorance and educational failure that is the curse of our times. From that perspective, beyond passing self-congratulatory judgement why waste further time on a beknighted scribbler from a dark period of history, sunk in the ignorance, superstition and moral depravity?
As Vico pointed out three hundred years ago, we have little chance of understanding Aristotle or any other non-modern writer unless we make the effort to see the world as they saw it - impossible to achieve fully but can be done to some extent because of our shared human nature and our knowledge of history, sociology and anthropology.
I do agree that there's a danger here. Often, I err in the other direction: understand the arguments as best I can and bracketing moral judgment. (It's what I tried to do with our reading of The Republic earlier this year.)
Lot's of interesting ideas here. The one that is capturing my thinking is the "slave by nature". Slavery is so bad in our view that the word derails thinking. If we replace the word "slave" by low-wage worker, can we say that some people are in this class by nature, as opposed to by circumstance?
Similarly, can we say that there are people who are natural managers (instead of rulers) and employees (instead of ruled people)?
And in today's world is someone born to higher status parents equivalent to "the greeks" and someone born to lower status parents "the barbarians"?
I think this a really interesting take, David. It actually helped me re-orient how I think about Book I. I also found it difficult to get past Aristotle's discussion of slavery on the first read because it was absolutely derailing.
Your manager / employee analogy is compelling because it almost abstracts away the "human" element and starts to build what feels like a community-focused teleology. It emphasizes disposition, position and skill -- what allows each person to best fulfill their role within the community (or given organization!). I highlight the community aspect because Aristotle's concern here doesn't seem to be the individual's purpose but rather the function of the community/state/household as a whole. In that context, the specifics of who is being discussed (slave, woman, child) are less relevant than how there is natural hierarchy built into various communities and fulfilling role well, with adequate relevant virtue. Of course, we have to remember the historical setting -- in Aristotle's time, "just" slavery and the natural rule of men over women are largely taken for granted. It's a good reminder to read in context and avoid eisegesis.
The discussion of virtue in Chapter 13 stood out to me as well -- it almost feels utilitarian. Virtue seems to matter only as long as it contributes to the fulfillment of one's role or function within the social order.
This sentence in particular stood out to me. I would love other' thoughts on it:
"Questions arise either way, for if there is such a virtue, how will they differ from free persons? But if there is not, though they are human beings and share in reason, it is odd."
I have made sense of Book 1 by taking the human out so I can feel less bad about checking my own moral compass to fully engage with the argument here -- so it's striking to me to revisit the passage Jared highlighted about those who are incapable of sharing or can be fully self sufficient which he neatly summarizes: "Either a beast or a god — but either way, inhuman."
Aristotle differentiates slaves from wage laborers though - slaves & masters have a more human connection by being part of the household. (1260b)
This is an interesting point. I'm not an historian or a linguist, so I have no idea, but it IS interesting to wonder whether "slave" is the best possible translation. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. Either way, I'm skeptical that some people are suited to "high" or "low" work, though some of us may more suited to teaching or flying airplanes or making pottery. On the other hand, if we give "the system" some sort of opinion on the matter, some people do end up being taken for granted as better for one altitude of work versus another. Thank you for your comment; it was a perspective I hadn't considered, and it's interesting to think about.
I agree with much/most of what you say. Except that low wages for the time of (allegedly) low skilled workers is a choice not nature.
What if our conception of high and low work was different? If playing the guitar or painting were the most well compensated work, would we still think that people's ability was a choice, or would we think it was more of their "nature"?
I'm not sure if I've misunderstood you or you've misunderstood me - no matter. I agree that people vary widely in their abilities and some people will be restricted to manual jobs that require limited skills and limited decision making. When I referred to "choice", I meant the political decision to allow these jobs to be badly paid.
Ah - I think we are looking at different sides of the bargain. I am taking societal values as given, and asking whether "nature" determines where the earner fits. You seem to be taking the perspective that societal values are a choice, nothing intrinsically needs to be paid more or less than anything else.
Interesting point.
I guess that I take issue with Aristotle's treatment of goods made within the household versus goods acquired through commerce, that is through purchase in the marketplace of the same goods. Goods made within the household are not free, despite what he says, because with limited resources, home manufacturing of one good, say olives, implies less of other goods, say feta cheese. And besides, the tradeoff goes increasingly against olives as the household harvests more of them: increasingly, feta production in pounds drops more, as one more bushel of olives is pulled off the trees. This is diminishing returns to olive production within the household. Suppose instead that more olives are purchased in the marketplace. The price ratio facing a household between olives and feta is constant in the marketplace. At some point, the household gives up less feta by buying a bushel of olives in the marketplace than by trying to grow the olives itself. This may be what Aristotle is referring to when he says that commerce is unlimited while home manufacture is limited. But by the same token, commerce is a valuable alternative to doing it yourself. If someone in Sicily can grow olives more cheaply than households in Attica can, then that commerce is worthwhile and it makes Attica wealthier. (I also detest his views on usury: taking out a well-considered loan increases wealth over trying to use one's own savings. Without 'evil' usury, large projects would be impossible.)
An interesting point I saw in the text is the moral distinction between two types of wealth acquisition. There is the form of acquisition that is necessary for living well. This form is limited by nature because the necessities of life are finite. The second came with the introduction of money and markets. Here, the goal shifts from acquiring good to accumulating currency for its own sake. Since money is theoretically infinite, the desire for it also becomes infinite, and thus unnatural. This would likely make Aristotle the first documented philosopher to identify and criticize unlimited wealth accumulation. He saw that the moment when money becomes the end rather than the means, it corrupts the economic function and displaces the true goal of virtuous activity.
By far the weakest argument for me at this point is the Man as better than Woman one. He seems to suggest at one point that there has to be a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference to justify a hard distinction in role, but then his argument seems to end with women lacking "authority". If anyone has a more interesting or charitable interpretation of his argument here I'd love to hear it, as I think I might be missing something.
Apart from this, lots of very interesting stuff already. Even relatively felt charitable to the master/slave distinctions mentioned here, with it being quite a good parallel to boss/worker
It's a surprisingly sparse argument! Which is surprising because, even if you ultimately reject it, there seems to be a stronger case to be made for natural difference between the sexes than natural differences between Greeks and barbarians.
It also takes for granted conventional views on women which Aristotle's teacher explicitly denies in the Republic. Socrates says that the only difference between male and female guardians might be in how much physical exertion they are made to perform. (I often roughly characterize this as 'They're the same, but the men lift the heavier stuff.')
You’ve probably answered this before (?) but are there publisher/translation preferences on: Nicomachean Ethics as well as Plato’s Statesman, and Laws? (I participated in the read along of The Republic and have that one)
For Nicomachean Ethics, I recommend the translation from University of Chicago Press by Bartlett and Collins. For Plato, I always recommend the Complete Works from Hackett.