Identity

I've been thinking about identity in terms of our mental models. If we conceive of our brains as modeling the world and ourselves in the world, then I see identity as more or less the mental model we have of ourselves, which to my current thinking would be something that is being constructed and reconstructed moment by moment, and is influenced by past experience, current environment/inputs and myriad other mental processes. I think our identity, like ourselves, is an ongoing process that is largely opaque to our conscious minds most of the time.

3dEdited

That is an interesting approach, I think I share some agreement with your conception of identity - particularly how it is constructed moment-to-moment. Buddhism has a similar conception of selfhood which is often called the mindstream, you’d probably find it interesting if you don’t already know about it! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindstream#

Edit: It seems you shape a model of your own identity almost by pretending to be an outside observer, or that's what your language felt like it was implying. What are your feelings on second-order observation? Do you think we make our own identities in first or second order? I feel like it has to be second order, at least subconsciously, since we're typically asking ourselves "what will the way others perceive me imply what they think of me?" I feel like we've all met someone who doesn't know how to draw that connection and often comes off as a bit strange as a result, e.g. an adult man wearing a tight graphic tee likely designed for someone half his age - uncaring, unaware, or just first-order observational?

3dEdited

Regarding your edit: It's an interesting question, and I suspect what is really happening is far more complex than I can actually conceive (much less explain). It likely involves both first and second order observation.

My subconscious has direct access to my thoughts, feelings and desires, and perhaps can use first order observation of these to build a model of "me."

But then it models "me" being "in the world," which might employ second order observation to confirm that the "me in the world" aligns with expectations.

Then, I am also constantly monitoring the reactions of others in the world to me and trying to infer what that says about what they think about me, inducing adjustments to both my own model of myself and my behavior.

That may not make much sense - just kind of thinking out loud here. Seems like a fertile ground for more thought though.

I would also say that there is probably something additional happening when I consciously reflect on my identity - on who I am and what I stand for. This process definitely seems like taking the perspective of an outside observer and evaluating myself from a distance.

As for the fictitious man in your post- I think it could be a bit of all of the above. He's probably a bit uncaring, likely also at least a bit unaware, and perhaps simply more heavily weighting the first order model of his own desires in his decision-making.

I love how detailed your answer is haha. Seems like you've given your sense of selfhood a lot of thought!

In the vein of Buddhism, I have been trying to avoid thinking critically about my identity intentionally, aiming instead to simply live and let any aspect of identity sort itself out without consciously identifying with it. Unsure of how "correct" or good that is outside of a Buddhist context, though.

2dEdited

I have definitely thought and read a lot about how our brains work, what consciousness is and how it functions, not that it's led to any certainty about any of that on my part! I am partial to the predictive cognitive theory (the idea that our brains are essentially prediction machines that seek to minimize predictive error), which I think has a lot of promise, but who knows if that is really on the right track.

As for the actual specifics about my own identity and the way I think about myself, I do think there is some utility in reflecting on it. In particular, if I think about what kind of person I would like to be - how I want to see myself (or what identity characteristics appeal to me) - I can then consider what types of habits and behaviors that imaginary person would have, and work toward cultivating those habits/behaviors in myself.

I think the key is to make sure one never gets too attached to any of these ideas of identity or desires for certain outcomes. That's the balance I sort of struck years ago between a lot of the Buddhist teachings I was exposed to and avoiding complacency leading to apathy. I kind of decided having goals and making plans and working toward changes is completely fine, so long as I did not become attached to achieving/attaining them. The intention and action in service thereof is sufficient; the outcome is not worth worrying about (it will be what it will be anyway). To paraphrase Lao Tzu, I try to simply "do my work and go home."

I suppose we have interpreted that differently then! I have found that the self as an illusion gives way to the Mahayana lovingkindness - we are biological creatures who take care of ourselves, but we are not truly separate from other creatures or the natural world, so should treat them with the same respect we would give ourselves.

By abandoning a striving for identity I have found myself acting in a more peaceful and consistent manner. The identity that results is just what is in order to operate with others. Then again, I still have certain things I want: I would love to be a writer, get a remote job, I picture myself getting married and having kids, etc.

I'm getting the sense that words might not be doing justice here. Perhaps we're just using different words (different fingers) to point to the same way of being (the moon). I feel like we are on/looking for similar Paths despite the semantic differences in our comments haha

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Yes! I am a long-time user of Sam Harris's Waking Up app, and my conception of the self, experience, and how our minds work is heavily influenced by Buddhist teachings like this.

Interesting! But would it not be advisable to teach people that our thoughts are subject to evolve, so the best practice may be to avoid liberally applying “I am” and instead use “I think/prefer/enjoy/dislike” followed by something specific? Obviously, there are objective truths that have their place for the function of a system, but those seem more like objective identifiers (I’m a professor/doctor/lawyer/convicted felon). I suppose I question the utility of ideological identities since, as you mentioned, a reasonable person is aware that our thoughts are far from complete. Can you think of anything we can be certain of that isn’t a current universal fact the we can then use as an identity?

If you identify as progressive (for example), would it not be more accurate to share what your specific opinion is and why? Unquestionably, the former is easier, but it’s without reason. So the utility of that identity seems to be a tool for social acceptance. If that’s the case, I don’t see how that person would have the capacity to consider anything outside of group ideology. Even if it’s possible, it’s not what we observe amongst the vast majority those whose identities are grounded in group ideologies.

2dEdited

I would caution on this point that to so strongly reject the "I am" phrasing as fixed is to perhaps miss the way that people in practice often use it.

While it is true that identity labels can sometimes come with the risk of rigidity or imposition upon the whole person - think, for example, of the way that disability activists have paid great attention to the finer points of the difference between saying "person with a disability" vs. "disabled person" for good reason - I do think that people often embrace "I am" language as almost a challenge or a way to overcome imposter syndrome regarding particular claims and then recognize when it becomes less useful as their identity evolves.

For example: there are many people who first come out as queer or first begin exploring gender or who first receive a particular diagnosis who may struggle with the question of whether they can claim it or may feel hesitant about acknowledging it as a part of themselves. But the very act of saying "I AM X" can have a kind of power. That's why movements like gay pride have existed and it's why feminist consciousness raising also often consisted of just changing attitudes or empowering people through those kinds of acts of self-definition and claiming. Often "I AM..." identity statements can be a healthy and very normal part of people's identity formation as they try on different labels or think deeply about what it means to say "I am this" instead of "I experience this" or "I feel this way right now". And this is even more true of identity labels imposed by others as well.

There may well be a psychological world of difference for someone in considering the space between, say, "I am gay" vs. "I feel attraction to the same sex". And there is certainly a world of difference for people between "I am American/Chinese/Swedish/etc." and "I reside in the U.S./China/Sweden/etc." Or, for that matter, "I am a writer" vs. "I like to write". To say "I am" under the right circumstances is to make a claim or assertion, to take up space, to declare an entitlement or to just even feel emboldened to fake a desired state until you are, which can then be transformative or liberating. "I am..." also becomes a way to more readily identify others making the same claim so that you can engage with one another and find each other. But it doesn't necessarily inherently lead to being locked in to anything.

And even the consideration of a negative imposition can force people to then confront things about themselves: people rightfully get defensive about the key difference between someone saying something like "you are a racist" vs. "you commited a racist act/made a racist statement" (as they should because people are often careless in the distinction). But sometimes the latter may be more true than someone may want to admit and the label and the holistic language can force more difficult self-questioning or self-examination.

I think you're right that there are dangers to the whole person label - I've definitely been in spaces where people get too attached to them or make them their entire being by leaning into them too strictly. And a great many labels, particularly political ones like left or right or liberal or progressive, etc. have become so all-encompassing or vague as to be useless. It's also particularly salient right now and something worth discussing with regards to profilicity where broad and reductive labels do become potentially signifiers and a kind of cheapened social currency where they can often come to represent an aesthetic more than a meaningful way of being. But there's just nuances there with regards to all the ways the language we use can shape our identity in ways both positive and negative.

2dEdited

Thank you very much for taking the time to put your thoughts down. I really enjoyed reading your perspective.

I should have mentioned that I think there are ideal applications of identities, but as imperfect being (I’m absolutely one of them), I fall short from my own “ideal”.

SENSITIVE TOPIC WARNING. Mentions pedophilia. Skip paragraph if preferred:

I was reading a book—and then later debated a friend—that discussed the topic of pedophilia that has existed within the Catholic Church (not to suggest it doesn’t happen elsewhere), and whether or not a priest can truly believe in his religion if willing to violate something so obviously wrong. My assumption is that priests, like anyone else, is a (very) flawed person who, in spite of knowing right from wrong, proceeds with terribly immoral act. I do not think the person proceeds completely unaware of its wrongness. I suppose my concern is that “identity” can be deeply and negatively consequential if one is to assume they are something (righteous and good), if they not that thing.

You used the example of racism, and at no fault of your own, I struggled to interpret your position on which of the two framings was most appropriate. Is it more accurate to say that someone who says something racist IS racist, or that the statement they made was racist? I certainly think someone can be racist, but I think someone can say something that could support the idea that they’re racist, but that the person may not racist. For example, someone can say “white people can’t jump” (isn’t that a movie), but if the sayer doesn’t judge that value of white peoples lives on a generalized observed difference, is the person racist? According to the definition, a racist is person with “the belief that human traits and capacities are determined by race, which inherently dictates the superiority of a particular race.” Oh my! I am worried that commenting my thoughts on this could be misinterpreted for insensitive…I’ll proceed with caution. I do think that the average white people can jump as high as the average black person. WAIT!!! Hear me out. There are massive amounts of studies that support that black people, on average, have a genetic profile associated with having more fast twitch muscle fibers than white populations. But does being aware of this, or stating this, or titling a movie on this, make a person racist? Personally, I don’t think so. But if someone’s belief that the scientific data is true about a particular races superior jumping capabilities makes them racist, then perhaps “racist” shouldn’t be a pejorative. The concern that I have is that, all too often, slanderous identifies are placed on people that don’t accurately represent who they are. Don’t get me wrong; Nazi’s are evil because the differences they observed (true or false) made them think that they were more worthy of life and happiness. PERFECT example, “Nazi” inappropriately gets applied to people with views that don’t align with their own views and, it’s a generalization, that those who apply it typically identify as “progressive”. Self identified “progressives”, on the other hand, tend to believe that their views are right, and that identifying as “progressive” is an expression of belonging to a superior set of beliefs. To be fair, “conservatives” absolutely do the same thing.

I think it’s virtuous to avoid identifying oneself out of vanity. I’m flawed, even when it comes to this very topic. I’ve told people I’m a pilot because I thought it propped me up in certain circles, but in those moments, I lacked humility. But if the pilot on a commercial plane suddenly becomes unconscious, I may tell the flight attendant that “I am a pilot,” because that’s practical information about that suggests my capability in a time of need.

I imagine there are examples where, in the example you gave, sharing that “I am Maltese-American,” may be necessary.

I’m only suggesting that identity for the purposes of influencing how others perceive you when it’s unnecessary may be vain, and that vanity is something that is not good.

“I’m an alcoholic” is a wonderful admission of identity.

Just thinking. I could totally be wrong. After all, they’re just thoughts and yours are just as worthy of being heard as my own.

Once again, I’m very grateful for your willingness to share yours with me.

In many instances, it's probably more precise to say "I believe" or "I think" rather than "I am," but I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with using "I am." If I say "I'm a determinist," I think most people would interpret that as meaning "I am a person that believes in determinism." I personally don't feel the need to be too strict on language here.

However, I do think we should keep in mind that using these kind of labels can only tell us so much, and they fall well short of explaining who a person is or what they really stand for. If we're trying to have a real discussion, "I am a progressive" explains little and might instead prompt something like "in what ways(s)? what does that term mean to you?"

I absolutely agree that we could all benefit (individually and collectively) by looking past such labels and exploring our reasoning and motivations for using them.

Absent any nefarious motives, if a person wants to use an identity label to gain social acceptance, I'm in no position to tell them they shouldn't, but I agree it's not something that does much to facilitate social discourse.

I will say though, I think there are cases where "I am" or "I identify as X" is probably the most accurate phrasing, and that is cases where holding certain beliefs or living a certain lifestyle is integral to how one sees themselves. Being so strongly attached to something in this way may not be particularly healthy or advisable (e.g. being so strongly identified as the fan of a sports team that you lose the ability to function normally after a loss), but it is something that occurs.

*searches “determinism”

Haha. Considering that I also closely follow Sam Harris, I’m surprised that I didn’t remember that word.

I don’t disagree that there are words that capture someone’s beliefs sufficiently so that further explanation isn’t necessary.

I don’t disagree with anything you said, but I’m sitting with the idea that there may not be anything wrong if someone uses an identity for social acceptance. Just because I can’t think of one (I is not vury smort), doesn’t mean there aren’t.

Sincerely, thanks for sharing your perspective.

Perspective acquired! Thank you. I see your point. I think my concern is when people use identity for no reason other than personal gain. I see how it can appear radical since I think identities function is to accurately identify you to others. Maybe I’m too focus on people’s desire to load up their social media bio’s with labels. I agree, ways to identify yourself is valuable. I just wish people focused more on who they want to be rather than locking them into something created by someone else. The identities that end critical thinking.

Thank you again for your comment. Sincerely, I appreciate you sharing your wisdom.

Agreed. To me, human psychology will form an identity naturally just by being. To force oneself into an identity, or to cling to one which may no longer be apt, is probably for disingenuous reasons (i.e. pride/status). Spending too much time online can make one miss that identity can be flexible, opting instead to try and fit into concrete labels.

I enjoyed your comment!

I think the desire (not the need) to identify yourself is almost always pretentious. I think meritocracy produces the best outcome if best is characterized by maximizing potential.

I hear the argument that some people have the desire to identify themselves, but what if the desire identify yourself beyond the objective is unnecessary, unhealthy, and dysfunctional. Identifying your name to a police officer is required for our justice system to function. But is it ever needed to tell someone that you’re conservative, progressive, Christian, atheist, etc.

In a meritocracy, there seems to be little use in what you subjectively identify as, but a lot of use in knowing the specific actions you’ve taken.

I think people desire identity in the same way that people desire religion. It establishes a sense of belonging, and without it, the bitter cold of the universe creeps in.

I think the solution to this identity crisis needs to come from those who play a role in shaping children (parents and educators).

I definitely and obviously don’t know anything. I just think. I come here for knowledge, but sometimes the words are too big. Haha

Hmmm that’s a difficult and radical take on identity. I see where you’re coming from, like we could dissolve a lot of unnecessary (and I agree, occasionally pretentious) labels by simply stating our opinions relative to the present context.

I think this is problematic in terms of community formation. People form groups out of similar thinking/belief, and those groups will eventually need a way to reference themselves that isn’t “me and these other people who mostly-but-not-entirely agree on a subset of ideas including but not limited to x, y, and z.” It also ignores identity that isn’t a part of belief. For example, I am half-Chinese. Sure, nationality is an abstraction in the grand scheme of things, but realistically it’s a fact that my grandparents took a one-way boat out of Hong Kong.

I found Hans Moeller’s YouTube channel and I did agree with him on taking a relaxed approach to identity formation. Identity will form naturally, and trying to force identity is just causing oneself to suffer without just cause.

2dEdited

I would agree with you that the labels broadly have a functional role in community formation initially just by helping people to find one another and establish their common ground.

Ideally any community is then able to support diversity within itself that doesn't then treat the label as somehow universal in its interpretation or as rigid or exclusionary. That may not always be the case, but it doesn't lessen the need for the label or the benefits on the whole of enabling groups of people to initially understand one another prior to then delving into the specifics of the label and negotiating among themselves what it comes to stand for or mean.

To Anthony's point, I get the desire to bring nuance and specificity into the conversation to a degree. For example I think the divisions into "left" and "right" politically are nonsensical and antiquated groupings that have little to no bearing on the realities of people's actual current political disagreements or beliefs in the present world and just hold us back from listening to one another on an individual basis to discover where there are more common challenges or common enemies or common understandings than we realize. But I am struggling to understand how you could even form a religious community or a political activist group without there being a very obvious base need to first say "I am a Christian", for example, or "I am a socialist" just as a base starting point, even if once you've gathered you still then will have disagreements or work to do breaking down what that then in practice involves or includes. You obviously don't have to proclaim yourself those things in non-relevant situations. But there are definitely scenarios where they matter.

I agree with you that there are instances where it’s appropriate to identify as “Christian”, for example, and the denomination when someone isn’t “non-denominational Christian.” To say “I’m Christian” is to say “I believe that The Bible is God’s word, and that it’s flawless.” To a Christian, The Bible is objective. You cannot actually be a Christian if you pick and choose parts of The Bible as true. If someone doesn’t agree with The Bible in its entirety, the person isn’t Christian, but believes ALMOST all of what The Bible says to be true.

Same is true with Muslims and The Quran, Jews and the Torah, etc.

If a person identifies as a Christian, Muslim, or Jew, it may be necessary, according to their religion, that they can only marry another person who strictly shares their religion.

Muslim women, for example, are strictly forbidden from marrying non-Muslim men. A man needs to say “I am Muslim” to be a candidate for marriage. To both parties, “Muslim” must have the exact same meaning.

Sorry for all that. Suffice to say, religious identities are of value since there’s one meaning. I’m not sure “socialism” carries that same exactness. That’s why I just think it’s more accurate to say something like, “I agree with many socialist ideas.”

I think effective communication is essential for being effective in general. We should strive for being as precise as possible when sharing our thoughts and ideas. If you are something, you are something. If you’re not, you’re not. So I think it’s best to say “I am” when you are strictly that, and when your not that thing, but share many things with that thing, it’s most effective to say, “I align with many of the beliefs held in (x) ideology.” That is what is true.

I’m sure I sound like a speech policeman. I’m not. I don’t stop anyone in conversation. I’m just trying to share my thoughts here since I think this may be the appropriate time/place to share and get feedback.

2dEdited

I do think you're right that we should strive to be precise. But I also think you're being overly precise in assuming that the meanings you think are there are ever being understood the same way by two parties.

There are, in fact, hundreds of things that one could mean when one says "I am a Christian". This could mean that they are biblical fundamentalists or fervently evangelical. It could also mean that they are merely deists who believe in the Christian God. They could be, under the umbrella of Christian, theologically then it turns out a Mormon, a Baptist, an Anglican, or - if you are talking to a historian about someone in the pre-reformation era or even today although it is used less often - a Catholic. It may mean that the person you are speaking to follows the bible, but it could also imply (although you may choose to take issue with it) they've never read it. Any term like that is always only as valid as the people who use it and is created in dialogue with one another as much as has a fixed meaning. Christian in fact, as I pointed out above, once meant pretty exclusively Catholic and now as a term rarely includes them at all.

On the flip side of your example, "socialism" does actually have a specific meaning that I would argue is about as narrow or as broad as Christian could be. It at the very minimum denotes to most people that someone has a politics most like on "the left" where they would agree that society exists and believe in a stable government who play a very specific kind of interventionist role in the economy that is stronger than a free-market capitalist believes should exist. From there, as with Christianity, it then can be made more precise by recognizing various subfactions and splinter groups and associated subconcepts. But it does have a meaning and a useful one that is sometimes necessary or accurate when one doesn't want to spend all day parsing all those minor differences and instead wishes to identify with someone else only at that highest level for agreement or simplicity's sake.

Some of what you refer to as "ideology" may well be things that are fundamental to people's lived experiences and less fragmented than you think to them and are tied just as concretely to external markers of belonging as religion is. My point is that to say "I am" is not necessarily tied to a statement of fact or a precise specific meaning when talking about identity, but in most cases but almost always has an emotional component for people even when facts are adjacent. I can say, for example, that "I am Canadian" even if I choose to live in Europe, and it doesn't make it less true based on my cultural or family background. And I can say it whether I was born here or raised here or just left my heart here after living here for a period of time and whether I have citizenship or not.

It isn't true of all things - I get how it could sound too relativist for some - and I would argue that you can't say "I am a tree" when you are obviously a human being. And you shouldn't say "I am a firefighter" when you've never stepped foot in a firehouse or trained to be one in your life. And I don't think everyone has to validate other people's "I am" statements either. If someone thinks someone's claim to Christianity is invalid then they can go ahead and say so and they can create a church that chooses to let the claimant in or not and sets standards for that specific church. And the Canadian government may have a different standard for what it means to say "I am Canadian" when it comes to handing out passports. But the disagreement over the claim doesn't make the person automatically wrong to claim it. A great many aspects of human identity are largely socially constructed and socially negotiated and therefore more subjective than we often want to admit. And sometimes the precision you are advocating for is just impossible to achieve without making any group exclusionary and non-negotiable and therefore inert as a functional concept that continues to be propogated. A lot of identity groups are not things you can, in fact, just be or not be in a binary sense. They exist along a spectrum of what it means to be them. But you aren't wrong that there is a constant risk and tension between too closed and too open a definition.

Yeah I think you're on point. We strive to have denotative meanings for terms because it's useful, but, linguistically speaking, connotation is all that's "real" to a given person. I've personally felt for a while that like half of disagreements (especially of political nature) would be settled if people just agreed on a certain definition of relevant terms BEFORE getting into it.

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Ella Asbeha

"Under profilicity, identity is found within and without. It is not imposed, as it is under sincerity, but rather constructed with an eye toward an audience. What is unclear to me currently is the source of incongruence — surely, given the focus of the next chapter, Moeller & D’Ambrosio will have something to say on the matter."

Maybe the incongruity comes from the fact that there is no one audience. Yes, the construction of identity and the construction of the audience itself happen side by side and the gravity of social media structures means that everything correlates with everything else. However, the conflicts in the margins (of both the audience and thus the self) are no less important; as a matter of fact, the nature of these platforms occasionally make these conflicts much more salient.

Megan Chase

"...the construction of the identify and the construction of the audience itself happen side by side..."

This is really well put...and the fact that you're intentionally constructing an audience does actually apply a sort of imposing. To have and maintain a certain audience you need to express certain views, etc. So there is a choice in the sense that you can decide to give up that audience (which often has become very intertwined in your identify so to give up the audience feels like giving up your identify), but as long as you want to maintain it you must follow certain rules.

Since you mentioned Henry Rosemont Jr. last time, I think Confucianism is a good place to talk about where I find this typology to be too crude. The discussion of a society where identity is purely role based was identified heavily with exterior action and appearance but even in the Analects we can see that there is already criticism of mere act and appearance.

Analects 2.2: The Master said, “If you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations and keep them in line with punishments, the common people will become evasive and will have no sense of shame. If, however, you guide them with Virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual, the people will have a sense of shame and will rectify themselves.”

I am personally very suspicious of another typology often deployed in studying East Asia, that of shame based cultures versus guilt based cultures. I think it is pretty clear that when the word shame, 耻, is used, etymologically speaking it carries the notion of an inner moral emotion which is socially mediated. The idea of a pure exteriority of simply avoiding censure from peers while internally being void of any further moral direction does not really hold up under any reading of these materials.

If you lead with 德 and 礼, virtue and ritual, from what censure are you trying to escape? Confucius and Mencius make it very clear, the censure the rulers might face from acting without virtue is not very significant in itself. They, more than anyone else, need to discover the genuine inner good of this way of life in order to create a society in which there could be social pressure toward virtue. Virtue is embodied and so it is taught through example, none better than that of the sage kings, the way of whom Confucius sees himself as a steward.

The people will develop shame under a virtuous ruler because there will be for them an example of real goodness before which they would feel themselves falling short. The people are not being rectified by external enforcements, explicitly Confucius always says this produces only bad societies, but they undertake their own rectification through the exposure to the example of the good ruler. Much like the rulers must be exposed to the example of the earlier sage kings.

In Mencius 1A:7, there is a story of a king who saw an ox being lead to be sacrificed trembling in fear and he could not bear to see it terrified so he ordered it spared and replaced with a lamb. Mencius tells the king that the heart he has in this moment, his compassion, is 仁, humaneness or goodness. And that if he can extend this compassion to his subjects, that is the method of 仁. The sage kings own exemplary nature, Mencius says, is owed to the fact that they could extend everything they did in this way.

In this story the king is actually said to be have been accused of miserliness in his replacing of the cow with the lamb, but Mencius rejects this interpretation and tells the king that his people have misunderstood what was really his compassion. Whether or not this is the case, it is clear that the author of Mencius thinks it is fully plausible in his time that someone could feel sincere compassion for a frightened animal and that this could be the basis for the development of their innate moral disposition into something even greater. It’s likely not necessary to remind the reader here of what some other pervasive attitudes toward animal welfare probably were at this time.

When we talk about a sincerity society based on rote social roles and conformity to those roles, we banish a vast storehouse of self-directed interiority which is clearly suggested by the texts. While the forms and configuration are very different, it is nonetheless hard to imagine that the formation of identity had nothing to do with unique personal experiences being intentionally cultivated and interpreted in their own ways.

If one might say that the emphasis of virtuous conduct was upon a moral pattern rather than completely idiosyncratic exploration of possibility with no guide whatsoever, then perhaps that is true enough. Nonetheless, the more we dig into any particular moment, I find that typologies like these become harder to see the value in. Even if they are not supposed to represent discrete states in history, they are not handled carefully enough to be truly useful principial forms used in analyzing social formations.

Just to hammer home how intensely Confucianism is not the blanket justification for whatever existing social forms happen to be, please read Mencius 6A:10. It’s a really sublime section. The key passage, the group which receives a condemnation worse than those who merely behave badly, is “Those who take compliance to be rightness are the thieves of 仁,” humaneness or virtue. They are worse because they actually misguide people about the true standard and what is actually humane and good.

To be a father or a ruler is not merely to conform to what you see around you. This is in fact the way of the village worthies, the thieves of virtue. It is because they do whatever is taken as good by the generality that you can find nothing with which to criticize them. They conform well to the standards of their “sordid age.” The junzi, the cultivated person, conforms themselves to the true standard but it might be that in so doing they walk an extremely lonely path. One need only look at the life of Confucius to see this.

At this point, I think we should be skeptical that sincerity society can only experience incongruity between roles and authenticity society between true self and role. Here, Mencius is submitting to us that we may find that no expression of role accords with the Dao and we must stand in an apparent opposition to the rules of society, which is Taylor’s formulation of authenticity that was shared earlier. If the picture of sincerity society can’t characterize the world of Mencius what can it characterize?

The picture, in the end, is much more complicated than deriving identity from some sort of ongoing social dialogue alone. It even usually involves resisting that social dialogue in what could be a called a creative and idiosyncratic manner. As Mencius said, the way is one, even while outward actions are many and diverse. It is the junzi who discerns the unity and takes the appropriate path.

Imagine the widespread case of the man who meets a 20 year old waitress or masseuse and suddenly realizes that he finally understands what love is. He suffered and worked hard in his current marriage, but it was always stifling and bitter and demanding. But now he sees what real happiness is, and that he could actually have it, and so he is leaving his wife. His 5 year old daughter is surely old enough now to understand that Dad deserves to be happy and that he will usually see her every other saturday for a few hours.

That man will easily find multiple people in his own social world who will tell him that it’s good that he is finally thinking about his own happiness for once. It’s healthy. And his daughter will be better for seeing her father flourish. In this complicated age of competing necessities and forms of life, he has no responsibility to the outmoded nuclear family, especially not at the expense of his own sense of being true to himself.

I believe it was in the last post that you related that the world of sincerity actually had a danger inherent in it, that the constellation of roles could be seen as constitutive of the world and thus deviation punished harshly for the preservation of order. I have known enough people who had fathers exactly like the one I just described to be able to tell you that those people are destroying worlds in ways so fundamentally brutal and disfiguring that there is no fit expression for it. And in fact, by our current understanding of social roles, such fathers need feel no shame. They will always find people who will tell them they’re right.

The fact that Mencius clearly has a lot to say to us about these dynamics and gives us a very subtle and nuanced picture of the inner life of virtue, alongside many suggestive passages from the Analects I did not mention, I think gives some reason to be reticent about the neat picture of identity these authors are painting.

Sorry for this being somewhat sketchy and off the cuff. There is a lot more I could have said to make this argument clearer but I have gone on far too long.

3dEdited

I do think this is a very important distinction between typical "Western" and "Eastern" moral approaches. I feel like Western culture, philosophy, and religion can often take a consequentialist view: i.e. the Ten Commandments, despite being theologically nuanced, are typically read as laws whose breaking would result in punishment.

Whereas, broadly speaking, Eastern tradition tends to value intention in a more deontological approach. The quotes you gave from Confucian thought being a great example: the same act is better carried out if the people understand its intrinsic good rather than acting out of a sense of externally imposed restrictions. Certain Buddhist sects often take the same approach, even some of the strictest precepts are flexible depending on one's intention with the act (e.g. drinking is forbidden according to the Buddha, yet I've read there are Tibetan Buddhist communities who use alcohol in certain ceremonies...often the precept is interpreted as intending to be clear headed by avoiding intoxication rather than the physical act of not drinking any alcohol).

As it relates to identity, how do you think different perspectives of morality align with identity formation? Is there a benefit to, for example, forming identity around an intent to be virtuous rather than on external social roles & expectations? I feel like there is a benefit to focusing on one's intention rather than pure consequentialism, which the authors of the book seem to consider more valuable with their belief in profilicity as the dominant mode of today while not caring about one's genuine feelings or opinions.

The Islamic tradition is also a good place to look for an interesting exploration of sincerity, authenticity, intention, and action and interpretation.

And just reading biographies from the ancient and medieval time periods, from anywhere in the world, sort of introduce enough ambiguity into this formulation of identity and society alone in my view to think that maybe some of these aspects have always been operative. Perhaps even profilicity.

I completely agree. I think profilicity is shallow identity without intimacy. Anywhere where the "general peer" could appear is grounds for profilicity to also appear. This is certainly not purely constrained to fairly recent mass media. I gave a hypothetical example in a previous post of a merchant in a busy trading town selling his wares to people from places of which he knows neither. Feels like crafting a profile to me!

Wow! You’re far more literate than I am. I envy your ability put down your thoughts.

I think mothers and fathers have a duty to nurture their relationship, especially once they have children since there is an innate duty/responsibility to directly participate in preparing their children for adulthood. If that’s true, then each parent also has a duty to become the most functional/healthy/knowledgeable version of themselves. That said, I think self-prescribed identities can prevent growth if their identities are something other than “I’m a person who has yet to learn all there is to learn. A person who strives for kind, compassionate, and moral, even when the recipient of my actions doesn’t recognize it as such. A parent who works to discovers how to best prepare my children for the world, the way the world is. A husband who conducts himself, to the best of his knowledge, in a way that serves to strengthen the marriage and deepen the love.”

I think there’s a middle between selfish and selflessness that is required to maintain balance. I just don’t know what that word is. What ever it is, I think that it should be instilled in our children.

The example of the husband you provided seems selfish, especially since it will prevent him from fulfilling his duty as a father to his children.

Maybe identities that contradict the ones I suggested lean towards selfishness.

I think that life is a balancing act. Life is the overarching system with many systems connected beneath it working to keep it all functioning. Those at the controls of any system must be aware of the functional consequences of not only the system they maintain, but its effects on all of the other systems.

I think it’s a recipe for chaos if we all have different ideas on how the world should be. People pulling levels without a unified goal. As a human, like all other forms of life, my purpose is to play my small role in contributing to my species survival through reproduction. Admittedly, as a human, I have a preferential bias for humanity. I’m rooting for team human to go as far as possible while being considerate of all other forms of life (plants, animals, etc). I’m responsible for my children, and to give them what they need means I must choose a female partner wisely and contribute to her wellbeing/function for my children’s sake. This isn’t easy, but it’s living life to the fullest. Fulfilling my purpose. There’s satisfaction in knowing that biological fact.

I feel like identity is more than a tool we use to facilitate intimacy. In the sense that we identify with an occupation, it could just be a result of circumstance, it could be because we enjoy the work, perhaps we get a sense of pride (as in superiority) because of it. I also don't think identity is limited to pride in oneself, which M&D seem to suggest with the opening of this week's chapter. In the context of this book, it would appear to me to ultimately be a tool for social engagement. That engagement could be for intimacy, for material gain, for status, etc.

I also really identify with (ha) the Native approach of one being a part of a group that is just a part of nature, and identity doesn't necessarily have to be striving for something beyond simply being. It reminds me a bit of Zen/Chan Buddhism with their belief that non-identity is an aspect of enlightenment. Bodhidharma, the attributed founder of Zen, supposedly engaged in the following dialogue when he came to China,

Emperor Wu: “What is the ultimate meaning of the holy truths of Buddhism?”

Bodhidharma: “Vast emptiness, no holiness.”

Emperor Wu: “Who stands here before me?”

Bodhidharma: “I don’t know.”

What do you all think would happen if we didn't have identity? Would we be reduced to animalistic behavior? Would it require ego-death? Is our identity the same or something different than our ego? In that case, would we become apathetic, or perhaps selflessly treat the world the same as our selves if we perceive our environment and others to be no different to our selves?

Davis

I returned to Moeller's interview with Peter Adamson on the Zuangzi, where he talks about identity, and it confirms your understanding of the theory.

He mentions another book he wrote with D'Ambrosio, *Genuine Pretending*, and he goes on to describe some of their ideas of identity. Indeed, "We develop our sense of self, and we think that is universally the case, through pretending, in that sense; we develop a sense of self through practicing a form of orientation to any form of identity."

Indeed, he goes on to mention that "an identity is something that is always built through pretense," and that it becomes genuine only through that. "Everyone is always genuinely pretending, everyone who has an identity." He does stress, repeatedly, that this is not a bad thing (much like how a child plays pretend). He thinks that the butterfly dream story (which I know he returns to in the next chapter) should be interpreted as 'all identities are contingent, all identities are transitory' and that if we realise it we can 'live our identities with a level of ease'. Basically, all roles and identity are contingent, and we often don't get to choose them (he mentions gender roles), and how often things are culturally constructed and how that can give us relief when we realise that identity *isn't* fixed, but instead we just play roles.

I really suggest giving that section of the interview a listen, it starts around 15:30 in the interview, and it really makes it clear (if the last chapter didn't already) how influenced they are by their interpretations of the Zuangzi, which seems to revolve around it teaching their conception of identity.

Joaquin

I believe that in the sincerity view the contradictory identities isn't the real incongruence. Roles aren't all in the same level, but there is a hierarchy of roles that one has to follow. For example, most people would agree that the duties of being a father are more important than those of being a salesman.

This doesn't mean that we have to give up being a salesman every time the chance of performing the role of being a father comes up, it doesn't monopolizes our behavior, everything has it's place in the pyramid of correctly performing the roles. Rightly performing the role of a salesman makes possible the accomplishment of rightly performing the role of a father (by sustaining the offspring).

I would say that to know what to do when those roles seem to clash one has to achieve discernment or wisdom, and that is accomplished by things that go beyond the topic of identities, like acquiring virtue.

The incongruence of the sincerity view may be that since roles are imposed, one could end up in a role that one rejects and still is forced into it. This can be experienced as a breach on one's freedom and it could be deeply uncomfortable to feel like you are living someone else's life.

I have to say, I'm not reading the book, but I've been reading your blogs, and I'm deeply thankful for it. I'm learning things that I would have never read, the topic of identity is significantly more interesting than I expected.

thepaperpilot

3dEdited

I don't think there are only _two_ views of ourselves (Me and I). I think identity is truly a relationship between us and an "observer" (ourselves or some other entity). That relationship is unique, because each observer has a unique understanding of the world, and thus one's identity to each observer is also unique. For example, if I tell two people a signifier about myself, e.g. being autistic, then each person is going to have a different signified they now attribute to me. A whole set of assumptions about how I act, how I look, what things I like, and so on. Each person with their own assumptions, based on their social context (where they've seen that word before, other people they know using that signifier, people they believe don't have that signifier, and so on). And of course, as our social context changes constantly from new input, so too do our identities - both to ourselves and others. And this isn't even getting into how people will present themselves differently to different audiences and how _that_ affects identities!

Honestly I kinda discount the idea of authenticity as a form of identity and as a general concept. At best it would mean when you intentionally present yourself outwardly in accordance with how you perceive yourself, but because that presentation must be perceived by a subjective observer it's no more "true", "real", or "objective" than had you chosen to present differently. You choosing to present in that way to that audience is, in fact, part of your identity. The idea that there's a core authentic part of you unaffected by is very essentialist (as opposed to constructivist), and I'm against the idea on that principle alone (so I agree with the point that identity always has a social component, but I would go further and question there even is a non-social component. Even our perception of ourselves is wholly dependent on our own understanding of signifiers)

Oh, also it was mentioned how sincerity was normative because each role is socially defined and imposed. I think that applies to profilicity as well. We see so many essentially strangers on the internet we don't expect to see again, so we lean into finding the box they fit in as quickly as possible. You see they have an anime picture pfp and assume _so many things_ from that alone. I think those repeated actions with strangers kinda makes the internet accelerate normativities being created, and makes it harder for people to be seen as nuanced individuals who grow over time.

2dEdited

I think you are right on to point out that even when we claim a particular identity marker - be it a nationality, an ethnicity, a diagnosis, a personality trait, a role, etc. - we always have to reckon with both our own conception of that marker AND external understandings of it that then get imposed upon our claim. This is something that even under proficility still would create a conflict even if we want to imagine that the inward self conflict over the idea of some core inner "I" can be jettisoned.

For example, what happens online under profilicity when the thing we signal as virtue to one group is interpreted as in fact malice by another? We see this all the time in online shaming and things going viral beyond the original intended audience. And in fact a big issue I have with the authors is that they seem to always assume that either a) there is some mass audience general peer constituting everyone who we could reach online that has a homogenous singular broad set of desires or beliefs we can predict, or b) we can target now our messages to specific sub-groups of that large general peer in ways that ensure that, again, we can predict who our audience is and in fact reach it. This is what also frustrates me about their lack of attention paid to algorithms and gatekeepers online.

I would argue that the fact that even when on a certain platform a person can very rarely predict who will actually encounter their persona or content. And that matters. Because I would agree with you that this then puts pressure on all of us to trend towards being as widely inoffensive and homogenous in what we share as possible because of risk aversion based on abnormal consequences of even the quietest or most carefully targeted speech (even in private platforms because people can screenshot things or even in public where people use their cameras and strangers have gone viral!). But what is worse is that it also creates a schizophrenic environment, because we are also encouraged under profilicity to constantly have to produce and share content and go viral and compete to be as loud as possible even up against those new unpredictable and ungoverned sets of potential consequences.

Essentially we have a world in which social norms are rapidly evolving and being renegotiated, only it is also happening in fragmented spaces where they can vary widely from even one group to the next depending upon the spaces you exist in. So we can't necessarily keep up with or even know whose social norms we are violating or why. And at the same time, those social norms are then being ever more rigidly enforced by essentially a kind of vigilante justice that also is just as unpredictable and rapidly evolving. You can't easily understand either the rules of social order or the consequences for breaking them because you don't even control which conversations you are entering into.

thepaperpilot

Yeah, honestly I think a lot of these problems could be solved by designing our social media platforms to make it harder for individual users or posts to go viral. Less influencers, less context collapse, and less harassment campaigns! Of course, I don't expect any of our current social media platforms to actually do this unfortunately

I think you are correct that online profile identity seems very dynamic but when viewed from a high enough height it’s easy to see how the trend is toward a mediocre leveling of difference into consumer categories the same as has been happening for many decades, rather than an unbinding of creative potential which is not immediately coded and directed toward specific ends.

thepaperpilot

No I think our _actual_ identity is very dynamic but profiles get dumped into categories very very quickly by readers facing endless feeds of content and thus users.

Wow! When I read this—or attempt to—I feel the consequences of not achieving a higher education, particularly in literature. Some of the structure was a bit over my head. From what I could process, I have thoughts:

I think there is a population of people wanting to fit into broad and consequential identities that focus more heavily on what is wrong and little ambition to learn how societal systems function. Progressive, oppressed, non-white. I think that every political idea aspires to make progress towards their ideal. Does my hope for increasing the success rates of intimate relationship by teaching healthy/functional relationships dynamics to children in public schools make me “progressive”? Or do my thoughts that women dressing in ways that are designed to attract the sexual attention of men counteract our shared goal for women to be observed as equals prevent me from being progressive? I worry that identifying as an ideology exposes an inability to think.

Even identifying with a specific belief within a set of beliefs is thoughtless. Unquestionably, every idea is the tip of an iceberg, where beneath the surface, there’s an inconceivable amount of factors that, to varying degrees, are overlooked. This is the reason, I think, it’s arrogant to identify with the things most people identify with.

Was it Aristotle (or Pluto) that first suggested that politics as an art that should be left to those who dedicate their lives to study the complexities of governing? Personally, I think the greatest form of self betrayal is to claim that you know something that you do not.

I think that identities, in a sense, are like religions. There are so many, and all of them claim to be right. It’s either that one of them is or none of them are. I can appreciate the virtues of many of them, while not believing in any of them. I prefer the stories that the universe reveals to us in the form of functional and dysfunctional systems. There are no words, only observations and interpretations.

I’m just here trying to make sense of this infinitely complex existence. It can be very uncomfortable not knowing where any of us belong. But I think it’s a much better alternative than finding comfort in belonging to an identity that thinks they know something.

Sincerely,

A Legend of Zelda Fan 🗡️ (guilty identity)

One thing which obscures the matter at hand is also that the whole discussion of profilicity is centered around the emergence of social media as such. Some would argue that people first began to intentionally construct and present an identity with the beginning of the journal craze, at least in Europe during the 18th century, and the rise of the novel.

I would not necessarily disagree with that, but I think even more salient for us is where did we learn to always think of ourselves as performing actions which could be seen by a hypothetical audience? Television and movies. Social media appeared in the space created by being raised by tv and films and learning to understand identity not as the result of your actions, chronicles of a life were often titled “the acts of so and so”, but as markers, as what could really be communicated by commercials and 30 minute shows.

That guy seems confident, like he knows who he is. So I will get a turtleneck and be like him. Until I feel that the turtleneck didn’t actually make me like him, I don’t believe that others are seeing me like I see him. And then you try on something else. You don’t aim at a goal achieved but at a state of being seen as something. And that something is always something which we imagine others to find desirable. Desirable for specific qualities and abilities? No, just desirable in itself. The celebrity culture developed by the rise of the TV.

So when I think that I want a partner who will love me and support me, do I really think this or do I think that I want a partner who people will see that way and attribute that to something about that that she is with me.

This is real narcissism, not the pop psych definition of an overly abundant sense and love of self. It’s having a weak and shallow sense of self which constantly seeks to absorb external objects into itself to become markers of its identity. If this process never terminates in the development of a stable and stronger sense of self, then you are left moving from one thing to the next, it never takes and you are never satisfied and you keep searching.

This kind of hollow person who experiences the narcissistic condition long after it is appropriate, ie long after adolescence, developed alongside the widespread adoption of a television into every household. Social media is a development of the way that this general psychology now operates but was not there at the beginning of it in our own era.

✍🏼kyle northington

The Score is FANTASTIC. i’m gonna need to hop on this train for that title for sure.

https://substack.com/@rehmiee/note/c-232935519?r=10r733&utm_source=notes-share-action&utm_medium=web

11hEdited

So I've been thinking a lot about a valid point which I will credit Moeller and D'Ambrosio with - their exploration of the paradox of authenticity where they discuss the way in which when told to "be yourself' without guidance one must always try on external identities to then paradoxically find oneself - and what this means for identity formation. And it's then led to ruminating on own my personal historical hyperfixation that I've been propelled down a rabbit hole chasing for a while now: the parallel development of consumer culture alongside youth culture in the mid-20th century and the murky shift in generational transition from the hippies to the so-called "me generation" of the 70's and then the yuppies of the 80's. And I'm going to throw this out there for people to consider...

We tend to think of "modernity" or "progressive thought" or a certain kind of post-Enlightenment movement towards social progress and equality as a more unified or coherent movement than it is. This happens with the 1960's a lot in particular. And there is a split there that often goes unnoticed in the intellectual history or that is sometimes perceived as a dialectical rather than a spectrum of thought related to a certain kind of romantic, libertarian individualist freethinker ideal vs. a more reasoned advocacy of and celebration of political rights and widening equality and social communalism. You could even divide them into in some respects the two concepts of "freedom to" vs. "freedom from" in terms of what they champion. And I would argue that both groups are very much engaged with the concept of authenticity and see it as a worthwhile. But they interact with it in quite different ways. And in my mind, only one of them runs into the trap of the paradox as the authors describe it. Because the more romantic strain of "freedom" advocacy at some point (and I would call this a neoliberal turn that started around the mid-20th century but was always simmering in the background) shifted the thing which authenticity arrived in opposition to - authoritarian obedience - to a new targeted enemy, which is conformity. And that's the one with its lineage more directly tied to thinkers like Rousseau.

Moeller and D'Ambrosio aren't wrong to see something particularly extreme about the degree to which "empowerment" has become a buzzword today, with more pop songs than I can count exhorting people that "this is me" and that it is important to do things your way or express yourself or stand out in the crowd, etc. Self-pride has become this weird panacea in our era where any obstacle you face is often something that you're told that you just need confidence (and nothing else) to overcome. And specialness has, as they write, become weirdly enforced and created an environment where we forget that if every human being is special, it also then means at the same time that nobody is. If you define authenticity - as the authors seem to - as having to always be not only "yourself" but some unique version of yourself who you're pressured to find who isn't like anybody else who doesn't conform or let themselves ever be told what to do, then that is actually exhausting and a paradox. You end up in this world of stuff like FOMO and being contrary just to have an opinion. I would hope we can agree that people who exist solely to be in opposition to everyone else, who can't like a thing the minute everybody else likes it and it's suddenly popular, or who are always "just asking questions"? Are obnoxious. And also more defined by others than the people who like popular stuff and who those people call "sheep".

However, the way to get around that paradox is to just turn back towards the other prior authenticity understanding, the one in which conformance wasn't inauthentic in any way, but to be authentic was just to have the right to self-create and self-define (even if that meant changing your mind or having more than one identity) and to respect that right and the obligations that came with it to protect others right to do the same. The one where it was fine to be a sheep if being a sheep made you happy and you chose it, and where it was understood that not everyone was born to be a leader or to be special or be unique. Where nobody had to perform their identity for others for it to be valid or feel like it needed acknowledgement to be real, whether that identity was countercultural or normative. The one where we understood that it was reasonable and fine to have lower aspirations and desires that weren't at the billionaire famous celebrity level. Could we not have an authenticity that accepts that to really be "ourselves", we first have to admit that we're one of billions of people and therefore likely to be pretty ordinary, and that we maybe need to stop elevating and celebrating exceptionalism of any kind rather than on a values basis? Or turning ordinary things about us into some kind of pride movement? That we're probably never going to be rich or famous or important to the world outside of our own friends and family? That owning "ourselves" as an identity means owning our bullshit and our flaws and our nothingness? (And not owning it in the empowering way where it is a secret advantage or we're "failing upwards"). Why is that - as Moeller and D'Ambrosio understand it - a turn towards embracing inauthenticity rather than just reclaiming authenticity?

I'm just curious what people think of that idea, because it's one I actually have been thinking a lot about lately. What if we could release ourselves from that paradox without having to give up on authenticity as vital to our identity formation because authenticity itself isn't the problem? What if we just let go of that particularly toxic way of viewing it and the pressure it puts on us? Is it possible that profilicity then becomes just a counter-movement in response to that toxic authenticity on the way to another version of it?

Rehmiee

There’s a quiet clarity in what you wrote — the reminder that consistency isn’t a discipline problem, it’s an identity transition. The self we’re becoming always arrives before the habits do. I’ve been writing from that same in‑between space, where the old self loosens and the new one begins to take shape. Leaving this here softly, in case it meets someone who’s moving through their own becoming:

18h

"Becoming" is such a great word, and one that actually gets used a lot specifically in sociology when talking about adolescent identity. But there's a way in which people get very hung up on it as implying a sort of progressive journey towards the moment when you finally "arrive" - when you are now officially an adult or a whole person or the person you want to be. And I think that it can mislead us, as we're to some degree always "becoming". We never stop.

I think it was Kierkegaard who said that the problem with striving for the meaning of life, particularly because we humans tend to do this via narrative, is that you can only ever know the meaning of something in full once it is over and you can see its totality. And we can't live our lives backwards or witness our end to ever fully see it as others can, therefore we can never actually access that meaning. No matter what we do, it is other people who ultimately do get to determine our legacy and what our life "meant" and they get to do so on their own terms, whether we like it or not. We can just be who we are and do the best we can and hope we presented ourselves as somebody with some level of coherence for them to find.

It actually amuses me to wonder if Moeller and D'Ambrosio in their concept of profilicity have accidentally stumbled onto a worldview that is the opposite of the letting go of attachments found in many eastern religions and philosophies. Under profilicity, people seem more concerned than ever with total control/ownership over their own presentation to others and micromanaging their reputation and legacy, despite the ultimate futility of it.

2dEdited

So I'm still a little behind at this point, but I want to come back to something that has come up before which is the way that Moeller and D'Ambrosio frame authenticity in a very confusing way to me that then impacts their exploration of identity as a whole. It's become clearer to me as I've read on, but they seem to frustratingly conflate authenticity with hyper-individualism under the conditions of late-stage capitalism. They insist throughout the book that the two almost go together and you can't have one without the other. As authenticity became our guiding principle, so emerged individualism.

This makes them entirely too dismissive of any critics - people as disparate as David Foster Wallace and Michael Sandel are named - who would argue that there is an authenticity that we can strive for that isn't the same thing as individualism. This is what Durkheim believed - they mention, briefly, his "cult of the individual" in Chapter 4, by which he didn't mean egoistic anomic individualism but instead believed that there was something genuinely bonding and communal about the way in which people were coming to believe that all individuals simply had a right to be perceived as bearing rights and agency regardless of their societal role or status. For Durkheim, authenticity wasn't about people having ONE inner self who existed behind a mask we present, but instead he saw that there could be a form of authentic individualism that was simply about recognizing the complexity of all the other individuals around us beyond their sincerity-based role or use value to us and allowing them the opportunity to explore their own agency as much as the next person. But it was about a reciprocal, communal commitment to one another - a coming together to recognize minority rights and open up new potentials for others to thrive as much as recognize new potentials in ourselves.

They also gloss over the way in which their full quote from Charles Taylor also speaks to this. Taylor doesn't appear to be arguing for authenticity AS individualism and recognizes that we are both ourselves with a right to explore our identities and determine who we'd like to be, but that this process is "in dialogue" and that privileging hyperindividualism over that dialogue and awareness of the co-creation is wrong, The authors even point out that they break from Taylor by arguing for individualism as a facet of modern authenticity rather than the other way around.

Worst of all, they seem to lay then all the blame for the hyperindividualism imposed on us by late-stage capitalism and consumerism at authenticity's feet unfairly. They equate authenticity itself with doing the "disembedding without reembedding" (quoting Ulrich Beck) and with creating the conditions of what Zygmunt Bauman calls "liquid modernity" where, as they quote him, "individualism is a fate, not a choice". Bauman is a terrific thinker and not wrong about the way in which we are currently caught in a world designed to alienate us from one another and atomize us into "free" individuals who no longer are tethered to any particular commitments to one another or anything beyond ourselves. He's worth a read. But I would argue that a) Bauman's writing on liquid modernity bears a lot of resemblance to what Moeller and D'Ambrosio are arguing profilicity is but their conception lacks his meaningful critique. And also, b) Bauman doesn't blame the very idea of authenticity for that, he rightfully blames the structures of consumer-based capitalism and neoliberal regimes of thought who have re-constituted our politics around the belief that "there is no society" that emerged on top of authenticity and reflect only one path that we could have taken under the belief in it.

For Bauman, our identities under the regime of liquid modernity are a reflection not of the imposition of authenticity but of its stripping out - the way in which all of consumer society's right to actual authentic choices with meaning and agency that could be real acts of self-creation (truly free decisions related to things like employment, health, environment, family, etc.) have been replaced by shallow signifiers of authenticity that are out of alignment with our actual agency such as clothing, musical taste, media we watch, and things we buy. But to get there, you have to define authenticity more broadly than Moeller and D'Ambrosio not as related to core inner selves that are fixed and match external presentation but instead as a flexible core set of desires, values, and goals we have that can then be fully expressed and aligned through action AND presentation at the same time. Where the things you present reflect genuine commitments and behaviours and modes of being rather than the merely symbolic or aesthetic, which seems to be all that Moeller and D'Ambrosio really allow for under profilicity.

The question that this all brings up for me is this: HOW do we believe that identity is self-created? What constitutes it?

Is it in our self-expression and self-presentation alone? (In which case profilicity reflects a blunt honesty about that, and sure, why not have everyone just present however they want but we all acknowledge that none of it is real and it's all a form of bullshit in a way).

Or is it in our actions? And the way that they ultimately express - outside of what we might self-present or try and convey - our values and commitments at any given point in our lives and the things that matter to us?

Are we just what we present and say? Or does it matter in any real way (which I can't find given any attention really in the author's argument) what we DO? Or is it the tension between what we think and say or how we desire to present and then that telling on us that comes from action and behaviour that then creates the identity dialogue that Taylor identifies?

Because to me, THAT is where authenticity lives and why I disagree that we evolved authenticity out of sincerity. I think authenticity just IS - we discovered it as a core conceptual premise inherent in us rather than invented it - and that the era of roles-based sincerity conflicted with it - as profilicity now does - and the discussion on it emerged/emerges now because we can't avoid that tension in either. I don't think we can reject authenticity and live under profilicity without just creating a new form of alienation from ourselves (not in a fixed core way, just from our own human nature generally and our broad desire to self-define and self-create but in relation to one another as social beings).

I like what you say here at the end especially.

I would probably not agree that authenticity exists in a state of straightforward conflict with roles in society or I would rather call them symbolic relationships. But I think the relationship between these two things is too subtle and varied to really treat in some general way like the authors are doing.

I guess the narrative they want to create about profilicity just feels cheap when you think about the fact that these are all real lives we are living where how we think of these things actually matters and isn’t just an interesting diversion.

The way I act and the way I understand myself have often not been in alignment and this has cost other people who paid that price for me and it does not feel like they are treating this matter with the gravity which would match my own experience of it. If self creation has a reality of worth then it also entails a duty. That’s a fundamental aspect of social life and it’s what the authors feel so abstracted from.