Marcus Aurelius' 9 Rules for Life
How to deal with difficult people, from the Stoic Emperor himself.
Next Monday will be our final installment of this read-along. In July, we’ll begin with the Nicomachean Ethics. Be sure to grab a copy before then — I prefer the edition published by the University of Chicago.
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Deep within Notebook 11, Marcus enumerates a list of principles. He gives us little preamble about the point of the list; as he says earlier, ‘the facts will speak for themselves.’ So let’s spend today looking at this list and seeing what we make of it.
Remember the various kinds of relationships I have with them.
Remember how they behave while eating, while reclining on couches…and most importantly how their principles leave them no choice, and yet how they preen themselves on what to do.
Remember that there’s no need to complain if what they do is right, and if it’s not right they’re acting involuntarily deprived on truth.
Remember that you your often do wrong and are no better than others.
Remember that you cannot be quite sure that they are doing wrong, because many actions serve some further purpose.
When you’re too angry or impatient, remember that human life is fleeting.
Remember that it’s not people’s actions that disturb our peace of mind…but our own opinions of their actions.
Remember that we suffer more from getting angry and upset about such things than we do from the things themselves.
Remember that kindness is irresistible if it’s genuine, not phony or feigned.
The context seems clear enough: these are Marcus’ maxims for dealing with others, especially those who have wronged him, annoyed him, or failed in some regard. These are the sorts of principles which Marcus keeps in mind in order to act rightly. Within this list, we see Stoic principles put into action.
For instance, in Rule 7 we see an instance of what we now call the dichotomy of control. Marcus is echoing Epictetus, the Greek slave turned philosophical teacher, in his Enchiridion:
Some things are up to us and some are not. Up to us are judgment, inclination, desire, aversion – in short, whatever is our own doing. Not up to us are our bodies, possessions, reputations, public offices — in short, whatever isn’t our own doing.
Marcus, Epictetus, and the other Stoics are dividing the world into two categories: whatever is our own doing and whatever isn’t our own doing. What makes it into the former category is quite small; we don’t even get to say that our bodies are up to us, as our bodies can be affected by fate, by others’ actions, and by nature. What we have control over, truly, is the working of our minds.1
But by now you are probably familiar with the dichotomy of control, and maybe even sick of hearing about it. What of the other Stoic teachings Marcus is recalling?
The first rule – “Remember the relationships I have with them” – may be a statement of what is sometimes called role ethics.2 This is an ethical theory which prioritizes the roles that we play in the social world — the role of a father, of a teacher, a friend, and so on. This is an area of possible overlap with Confucian ethics, actually, as those theories tend to emphasize our relational and social nature more than later Western theories.
What we owe to one another is deeply impacted by the relationships between us. So, I owe you something as my reader; you do not share those obligations or duties, though perhaps you have some duties to me as a reader of my work. The relationship is asymmetrical, and thus our moral duties are asymmetrical.3A father owes something to his son; the son owes something different to his father. This sort of observation can be extended to nearly all parts of life. Our roles tell us what we have to do.
So as we struggle with some interpersonal conflict, the first step is to remember our relationships. I owe the whole world kindness and respect, but what do I owe this person in particular?
When Marcus later writes in Rule 2 that we ought to remember how these people behave while eating and reclining, and how they preen about what to do, he is assuming a level of familiarity as well. Though in this case, the reasoning at play is that Marcus wants to evaluate how these people handle their passions — do they control their passions, or do their passions control them? Are they frequently unable to live by their principles? In that case, the response is pity, not anger. They have forgotten who they are and how they ought to act, the Stoic would say. (This reasoning extends to Rule 3 as well, with some variation.)
The final rule, Rule 9, is a difficult one. It does not ring true for me, though I think this is because we commonly misunderstand kindness.
When I think of kindness, I think of people who are nice. They are pleasant, affable, sociable — but that does not mean that they act rightly. We place a lot of value on being nice, in part because we place a lot of value on appearances. Being nice is a stand-in, a superficial way of appearing moral without managing to do anything which may be uncomfortable for us.
But this may the feigned kindness that Marcus mentions. This is kindness which does not genuinely wish for the good of the other, but only strives to appear to wish for it. And so it is not the kindness that is actually irresistible.
All people, the Stoics say, have a natural and respectable desire to preserve themselves. This drive for self-preservation is what enables us to survive, and the Stoics see this as a foundational concept. This drive sometimes overextends, we might say, and leads us to our worst vices — gluttony, greed, and the like. But in a healthy proportion, it is a foundation for a good life.
Now imagine that kindness is something like love, as defined by later thinkers like Thomas Aquinas: willing the good for the other. If kindness is about willing the good of the other, and the other in this case can see that we are genuine, then we can see the force behind Marcus’ point. Since human beings desire to preserve themselves, and even to flourish, and by being kind we are showing that we also desire them to flourish, then it is natural that others will find this kindness truly compelling, if not irresistible.
This is a point that still might need to be clarified or recalibrated given what we now know of psychology. I wrote about this quite briefly here.
A good reference here is this book: The Role Ethics of Epictetus. Two notes: that is an affiliate link (and so I earn a commission if you make an eligible purchase) and the book is painfully expensive.
There are clearly symmetrical relationships too, like a friendship between peers, with corresponding symmetrical obligations.
I like the Aquinas version of kindness- willing the good for others. I often think its applied today as some sort pf “nice” gesture which equates to a quid pro quo of emotional co-dependance. That sort of superficiality has never worked for me personally. Willing the good for others isnt Acting the good for others: how the heck would i even know what is the good for another when even obvious short term acts of good may have long term consequences not for someones good.
Thank you for this post!