As a man who constantly wrestles with frugality, Aristotle's discussion of liberality and magnificence was a hard word to receive at points, though they were necessary. As I mulled over his thoughts, and supplemented them with Biblical injunctions of the same nature, I was reminded of the beauty of giving for the sake of others. You truly can't spell miserable without miser. Thanks for you work!
My translation, the Terence Irwin edition, lists these virtues as generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, ‘the virtue concerned with small honors’, calmness, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, shame (which he concludes is not a virtue or at least not consistent with someone who is virtuous).
The virtue of magnificence was a completely new concept for me. At first, this virtue seems to be only available for the rich. I imagine that I can consider donations to charities or other public works a small form of magnificence.
I had some trouble wrapping my head around magnanimity (or as you better phrased it — great souled).
I was a little dismayed to find that Aristotle thought it wrong to not recognize when one person has more worth than another. Modern ethics tends to build from the basic principle that we all have equal worth. Zarathustra often says that ‘men are not equal’. Was Nietzsche looking back to the morals of this time while reject ‘herd morality’? Going with the ‘Aristotle is always right’ technique, what am I to learn from this?
I think even if one is put off by Aristotle's apparent treatment of great-souled individuals, who must basically be rich to be such, as being "better" than those who are not, we can still find some wisdom here. In fact, I don't even think the main thrust of Aristotle's point has anything to do with society recognizing the greatness of such people. He is saying that the virtue here lies in a person with the means and ability to achieve great things (i) recognizing this about themselves and (ii) then utilizing this means and ability to actually achieve such things - and for the right reasons, not for their own self-aggrandizement. In a more general sense, it's the idea that we should all do things for the greater good to the extent we are able, but in this case applied to those individuals who have great means with which to do so.
That makes sense. If I recognize that I am ‘better’ than someone else, I can think of it as being better suited to doing some public good than the other person and also recognizing that my means and abilities give me a responsibility to undertake this task.
It also means that I recognize that this other person is not suitable to the task and I should not expect them to take on a task outside of their ‘station’.
I don't even think it has to be in comparison others, especially since we aren't really even in a position to know what others are capable of. More in comparison to oneself. Am I capable of doing more? Or by extension to a group of people, are we reaching our potential? There is virtue in recognizing our true potential and striving to realize it.
A good example of a great-souled person is the ideal of the ship's captain, who exemplifies all of the virtues, including putting the welfare of the ship's crew and passengers ahead of his own. For an example from literature, see Joseph Conrad, The Shadow Line. For examples from real life, visit Nova Scotia for many a stirring and true tale. I find the notion of the great-souled person to be familiar from the lives of the best of our contemporaries, and not at all strange. Leaders eat last. In Aristotle's time men cut from the sternest cloth would have been the most valued.
The fourth book of the Nicomachean Ethics is one where Aristotle shows how blurred the lines are between what we today called ethics and what we today called etiquette.
A very general question about the text, that came to my mind when you observed the sudden "gear shift" in the middle of Book III: Was the division of the text into books and chapters imposed by Aristotle, or was this division added at a later time?
I need to check, but I believe basically all of Aristotle's writings were compiled and structured later by students. I don't think we have the pure, original copies of anything.
As a man who constantly wrestles with frugality, Aristotle's discussion of liberality and magnificence was a hard word to receive at points, though they were necessary. As I mulled over his thoughts, and supplemented them with Biblical injunctions of the same nature, I was reminded of the beauty of giving for the sake of others. You truly can't spell miserable without miser. Thanks for you work!
My translation, the Terence Irwin edition, lists these virtues as generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, ‘the virtue concerned with small honors’, calmness, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, shame (which he concludes is not a virtue or at least not consistent with someone who is virtuous).
The virtue of magnificence was a completely new concept for me. At first, this virtue seems to be only available for the rich. I imagine that I can consider donations to charities or other public works a small form of magnificence.
I had some trouble wrapping my head around magnanimity (or as you better phrased it — great souled).
I was a little dismayed to find that Aristotle thought it wrong to not recognize when one person has more worth than another. Modern ethics tends to build from the basic principle that we all have equal worth. Zarathustra often says that ‘men are not equal’. Was Nietzsche looking back to the morals of this time while reject ‘herd morality’? Going with the ‘Aristotle is always right’ technique, what am I to learn from this?
I really enjoyed the technical analysis of wit.
I struggeld most with magnamity - it seems to me not really virtuos at all!
I think even if one is put off by Aristotle's apparent treatment of great-souled individuals, who must basically be rich to be such, as being "better" than those who are not, we can still find some wisdom here. In fact, I don't even think the main thrust of Aristotle's point has anything to do with society recognizing the greatness of such people. He is saying that the virtue here lies in a person with the means and ability to achieve great things (i) recognizing this about themselves and (ii) then utilizing this means and ability to actually achieve such things - and for the right reasons, not for their own self-aggrandizement. In a more general sense, it's the idea that we should all do things for the greater good to the extent we are able, but in this case applied to those individuals who have great means with which to do so.
Thanks.
That makes sense. If I recognize that I am ‘better’ than someone else, I can think of it as being better suited to doing some public good than the other person and also recognizing that my means and abilities give me a responsibility to undertake this task.
It also means that I recognize that this other person is not suitable to the task and I should not expect them to take on a task outside of their ‘station’.
I don't even think it has to be in comparison others, especially since we aren't really even in a position to know what others are capable of. More in comparison to oneself. Am I capable of doing more? Or by extension to a group of people, are we reaching our potential? There is virtue in recognizing our true potential and striving to realize it.
A good example of a great-souled person is the ideal of the ship's captain, who exemplifies all of the virtues, including putting the welfare of the ship's crew and passengers ahead of his own. For an example from literature, see Joseph Conrad, The Shadow Line. For examples from real life, visit Nova Scotia for many a stirring and true tale. I find the notion of the great-souled person to be familiar from the lives of the best of our contemporaries, and not at all strange. Leaders eat last. In Aristotle's time men cut from the sternest cloth would have been the most valued.
On the second line of the last section. You wrote: "Virtue is not a characteristic". Did you mean "shame is not a characteristic"?
The fourth book of the Nicomachean Ethics is one where Aristotle shows how blurred the lines are between what we today called ethics and what we today called etiquette.
A very general question about the text, that came to my mind when you observed the sudden "gear shift" in the middle of Book III: Was the division of the text into books and chapters imposed by Aristotle, or was this division added at a later time?
I need to check, but I believe basically all of Aristotle's writings were compiled and structured later by students. I don't think we have the pure, original copies of anything.