I am grappling with the implications of this line in Book III (1114a20):
“… it was possible at the beginning for both the unjust person, and the licentious one not to become such as they are, and hence they are what they are voluntarily; but once they become such, it is no longer possible for them to be otherwise.”
I get the broader point regarding blameworthiness, but does Aristotle believe the vicious person is totally irredeemable (and perhaps likewise that the virtuous person cannot conceivably become vicious)? Or is something else going on here?
I got the sense this was related to his earlier point that an unjust person can't just decide to be just and have it be so. Once you have habituated to be unjust, you're unjust, and doing something just (or even a few somethings) won't change that. I think maybe he's only saying here that the unjust person can't "be" otherwise, not that they can't "become" otherwise by habituating themselves to be just again through a similar process to the one that made them unjust. This would likely take a long time and much effort to accomplish, however. Your point is well taken because I don't think it's completely clear, but that was my feeling at the time I read it.
Thanks! This would make more sense to me and intuitively feels more in line with Aristotle’s messaging. I like the “be” vs “become” reading, which makes me want to get home from work so I can re-read it with a fresh set of eyes.
Whew! Book II was an easier read than Book I, but the first five chapters of Book III really ramped up the difficulty. It seems like there's an entire theory of action in there, but I can't piece it all together.
The one thing I did get was that Aristotle wants to distinguish between "voluntary" actions and "chosen" actions. Voluntary actions have their source within the agent. Chosen actions are, in addition to being voluntary, have been deliberated about.
Could "chosen" perhaps have been translated as "freely chosen"?
In that part of Book III Aristotle first deals with the topic of voluntary as opposed to involuntary action. He tries to answer the question "what makes an action voluntary? what involuntary?". He then moves to the topic of what steps may precede an action. For example, we may first make a plan of action, i.e. deliberate, our plan comprises a number of choices that we have decided to make, we then act on our choices in order to bring our plan to life. We hope that everything will work as planned. This is very rough around the edges but I hope it helps.
I disagree with Aristotle and align more with Plato on the problem of akrasia. I think there is always some level of non culpable ignorance in any wrongdoing, or at least not fully culpable.
It definitely feels weird to me to include otherwise voluntary actions done on account of ignorance in a category called "involuntary," unless they are done without any remorse after the fact (when presumably the actor is no longer ignorant), in which case they are called "nonvoluntary." It does make sense from the standpoint of how we treat them with regard to praise and blame, but some part of my mind is perturbed by it.
This is interesting, and you may well be right. In modern legal theory, I think voluntarily is typically defined as simply anything done without external compulsion. Acts undertaken on account of ignorance are further distinguished by concepts like acting "knowingly" (or not) and "intentionally" (or not) rather than lumped into a definition of involuntary. The part of my mind perturbed by Aristotle's definition is probably those deep dark recesses that still retain some knowledge from my criminal law and torts classes many years ago.
I also may be over-generalizing modern law and of course I'm working with a translation of Aristotle and not reading in his native language, so there's that as well. Nevertheless, nice observation.
A person can be willfully ignorant and thus held accountable for their actions. There are things you know you should know before taking some action and if don’t try to find out, then you can’t hide behind ignorance. Holding people accountable for driving drunk is another example of this. You voluntarily choose to put yourself in a position where you would be likely to drive drunk an injure someone.
Right, the distinctions make sense, but changing whether actions are called voluntary or not feels odd rather than further distinguishing among voluntary actions. It's something that comes up in the law all the time. You end up with terms of art that make perfect sense once examined, but differ from the plain meaning in ways that seem confusing to anyone who doesn't know the legal definition.
I am grappling with the implications of this line in Book III (1114a20):
“… it was possible at the beginning for both the unjust person, and the licentious one not to become such as they are, and hence they are what they are voluntarily; but once they become such, it is no longer possible for them to be otherwise.”
I get the broader point regarding blameworthiness, but does Aristotle believe the vicious person is totally irredeemable (and perhaps likewise that the virtuous person cannot conceivably become vicious)? Or is something else going on here?
I got the sense this was related to his earlier point that an unjust person can't just decide to be just and have it be so. Once you have habituated to be unjust, you're unjust, and doing something just (or even a few somethings) won't change that. I think maybe he's only saying here that the unjust person can't "be" otherwise, not that they can't "become" otherwise by habituating themselves to be just again through a similar process to the one that made them unjust. This would likely take a long time and much effort to accomplish, however. Your point is well taken because I don't think it's completely clear, but that was my feeling at the time I read it.
Thanks! This would make more sense to me and intuitively feels more in line with Aristotle’s messaging. I like the “be” vs “become” reading, which makes me want to get home from work so I can re-read it with a fresh set of eyes.
The description of moderation towards the end has a strong hint of stoicism...
More likely that the Stoic description of moderation has a strong hint of Aristotelianism.
I received a notice about the zoom call but couldn’t make the link work.
The most surprising sentence to me: "Nor if a person is confident when he is about to be flogged is he courageous."
Whew! Book II was an easier read than Book I, but the first five chapters of Book III really ramped up the difficulty. It seems like there's an entire theory of action in there, but I can't piece it all together.
The one thing I did get was that Aristotle wants to distinguish between "voluntary" actions and "chosen" actions. Voluntary actions have their source within the agent. Chosen actions are, in addition to being voluntary, have been deliberated about.
Could "chosen" perhaps have been translated as "freely chosen"?
In that part of Book III Aristotle first deals with the topic of voluntary as opposed to involuntary action. He tries to answer the question "what makes an action voluntary? what involuntary?". He then moves to the topic of what steps may precede an action. For example, we may first make a plan of action, i.e. deliberate, our plan comprises a number of choices that we have decided to make, we then act on our choices in order to bring our plan to life. We hope that everything will work as planned. This is very rough around the edges but I hope it helps.
So glad to hear the call will be recorded!
I disagree with Aristotle and align more with Plato on the problem of akrasia. I think there is always some level of non culpable ignorance in any wrongdoing, or at least not fully culpable.
It definitely feels weird to me to include otherwise voluntary actions done on account of ignorance in a category called "involuntary," unless they are done without any remorse after the fact (when presumably the actor is no longer ignorant), in which case they are called "nonvoluntary." It does make sense from the standpoint of how we treat them with regard to praise and blame, but some part of my mind is perturbed by it.
When I read this segment of Book III, I get the feeling Aristotle adopted these positions from the way the courts dealt with such cases at the time.
This is interesting, and you may well be right. In modern legal theory, I think voluntarily is typically defined as simply anything done without external compulsion. Acts undertaken on account of ignorance are further distinguished by concepts like acting "knowingly" (or not) and "intentionally" (or not) rather than lumped into a definition of involuntary. The part of my mind perturbed by Aristotle's definition is probably those deep dark recesses that still retain some knowledge from my criminal law and torts classes many years ago.
I also may be over-generalizing modern law and of course I'm working with a translation of Aristotle and not reading in his native language, so there's that as well. Nevertheless, nice observation.
A person can be willfully ignorant and thus held accountable for their actions. There are things you know you should know before taking some action and if don’t try to find out, then you can’t hide behind ignorance. Holding people accountable for driving drunk is another example of this. You voluntarily choose to put yourself in a position where you would be likely to drive drunk an injure someone.
Right, the distinctions make sense, but changing whether actions are called voluntary or not feels odd rather than further distinguishing among voluntary actions. It's something that comes up in the law all the time. You end up with terms of art that make perfect sense once examined, but differ from the plain meaning in ways that seem confusing to anyone who doesn't know the legal definition.